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JUDICIAL NOTICE: HOW JUDICIAL BIAS IMPACTS THE
UNEQUAL APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
PRINCIPLES IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
VICTOR SUTHAMMANONT*
[F]or love of grace,
Lay not that flattering unction to your soul,
That not your trespass but my madness speaks.
It will but skin and film the ulcerous place,
Whiles rank corruption, mining all within,
Infects unseen.1
I. INTRODUCTION
A black teen and a white teen walk into a store.  While the
white teen wanders the store browsing, the black youth is stalked by
the suspicious shopkeeper.2  Later, while the same two youths are
driving down the New Jersey Turnpike, the black teen is more likely
to be stopped, and his car searched.3  Socially, there may be paren-
* J.D. Candidate New York Law School, May 2005.  There are too many people
for me to thank by name in this space.  While all the professors here have been ex-
tremely generous, I would like to thank Prof. David Chang for teaching me the con-
cepts and skills I used to write this Note, Prof. Nadine Strossen for her advice and
support of my efforts, and Prof. Denise Morgan for her thoughtful and constructive
feedback.  Additionally, I thank the staff of the New York Law School Law Review for their
many contributions.  All errors are my own.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 3, sc.
4, ln. 146-51 (Harold Jenkins ed., Methuen & Co. LTD 1982).
2. See Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to
Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2003).
3. See, e.g., ST. POLICE REV. TEAM, OFF. ATT’Y GEN., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE
POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (1999), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf, cited in Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial
Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 41, 50 n.24 (2001); Warren Cornwall &
Cheryl Phillips, The Racial-Profiling Question: How is the State Patrol doing?, SEATTLE TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2003, at A1 (reporting that although stopped in equal rates, minorities were
searched twice as much as whites); David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues That the U.S.
Wrote the Book on Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at A1 (reporting New Jersey’s
contentions that the United States government encouraged racial profiling).
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tal pressures not to date or socialize with others of a different race.4
Applying to college, the black teen may be admitted into an institu-
tion ahead of the white teen who has higher indicator scores.5  This
is life as it is lived everyday by millions of Americans.  Yet, when
issues of race are brought before courts, they remain ignorant of
the realities facing people of color and are ill equipped to render
the equal justice due to all.6  Affirmative action is one area where
this inequity is apparent, but not in the ways usually alleged.7  The
burdens faced by minorities and others friendly to their interests in
implementing and maintaining affirmative action programs remain
far greater than the burdens faced by those seeking to preserve the
unequal distributions of opportunity resulting from over a hundred
years of political and societal oppression.
Unequal treatment has been a fact of life in the United States
since the nation was born.8  Political and social equality did not ex-
ist.  Even the Fourteenth Amendment, designed to grant legal
equality, did not remedy political and social oppression.9  Despite a
few victories,10 for nearly the first hundred years of Equal Protec-
tion jurisprudence the courts allowed pernicious legislation and ra-
4. See Note, Racial Steering in the Romantic Marketplace, 107 HARV. L. REV. 877, 889
(1994); Taunya Lovell Banks, Both Edges of the Margin: Blacks and Asians in Mississippi
Masala, Barriers to Coalition Building, 5 ASIAN L.J. 7, 33 (1998); Ronald Smothers, Princi-
ple Causes Furor on Mixed Race Couples, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 1994, at A10, cited in Mark
Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don’t Ask, if it is, Don’t Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and the
Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 375 (1995). See also SAVE THE LAST DANCE (Paramount
2001) (examining the issues facing a mixed race couple); O (Lions Gate 2001) (same,
update of Shakespeare’s Othello); JUNGLE FEVER (Universal 1991) (same). But see Anne
Marie O’Connor, Learning to Look Past Race, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1999, at A1.
5. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down University
of Michigan’s affirmative action program).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
7. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (challenge to the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program as unfair to whites); Adarand
Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (challenge to affirmative action program as
unfair to white contractor).
8. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (discussing how blacks would be accounted
for in the census); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting Congress’s power to proscribe the
importation of slaves prior to 1808); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (discussing fugitive slaves).
9. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION (1988).
10. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1879).
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cially discriminatory enforcement to stand.11  During a brief period
of racial justice,12 the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed.13  Unfor-
tunately, minorities still face political and social challenges.  Some
of these challenges can be addressed by the law; some are beyond
the law’s reach.  Racial animosity has been driven underground.
There it lurks, awaiting its chance to rise, as it does from time to
time in matters of social policy14 and matters of life and death.15
One of the remaining areas where unequal protection still ex-
ists in the law is the difference between the judicial treatment of
those laws enacting and those ending an affirmative action pro-
gram.  There are a variety of ways of “ending” affirmative action: a
repeal of a specific program, a general ban, a regulatory change, a
court decision.16  This Note specifically addresses only challenges17
to those state actions (whether a repeal, a prospective ban, etc.)18
that have the effect of ending or repealing an already existing pro-
11. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896).
12. For example, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), struck down anti-miscege-
nation laws, and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), ended the doctrine of
“separate but equal” in public schools.  The changing social values are reflected in the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2004)).
13. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to
2000h-6 (2004)).
14. See generally Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs Dur-
ing the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611 (2000) (discussing
how race affected the formulation of drug laws); Charisse Jones, Crack and Punishment:
Is Race the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, October 28, 1995, at sec. 1, 1 (same).
15. See, e.g., Carol Marie Cropper, Black Man Fatally Dragged In a Possible Racial
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A16 (reporting the murder of James Byrd Jr. in
Texas).
16. Regulatory change is meant to encompass state actions taken at the adminis-
trative or agency level, such as changes in program criteria or requirements, or changes
in school admissions policies, etc., that have the effect of curtailing or ending benefits.
Sunset provisions, another manner of ending an affirmative action program, are not
considered here because they are outside the scope of analysis pursued in this Note.
17. Although a challenge to the repeal or ban of a law is uncommon, it is not
prohibited by issues of standing or immunity, nor is it without precedent. See, e.g.,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp.
1480, 1491-92 (N.D. Cal. 1996). See also discussion infra note 326.
18. Because this Note only addresses actions that have the effect of repealing an
existing program, regardless of the form of the action, it will use the word “ending”
interchangeably with words such as repeal, ban, forbid, etc.
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gram, although the analysis pursued may relate to other
situations.19
As a law with a racial classification, a law implementing an af-
firmative action program is subject to the “most rigid scrutiny” by
the judiciary due to the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause.20  Although originally construed to protect minorities from
legislation or state action undertaken with an “evil eye and unequal
hand[,]”21 the Equal Protection Clause in recent jurisprudence has
been interpreted to protect “innocent whites” from inequities im-
posed by affirmative action programs.22  The obstacles of strict scru-
tiny are incredibly difficult to overcome.  As a facially neutral
action, a state ending an affirmative action program is merely re-
quired to show a rational basis for the law.23  This is an easy burden
for a state to meet.  Therefore, while those seeking to advance mi-
nority interests with constitutionally proper purposes must survive
strict scrutiny, those acting to harm minority interests by ending
affirmative action, even if possessing an impermissible purpose,
must withstand the least of scrutiny to do so.24  Given the hostility of
courts to minority concerns,25 courts are ill equipped to guard
against impermissible purposes underlying some facially neutral
laws, and a new test for purposes rooted in racial animosity or stere-
19. For example, a state or locality without any existing affirmative action program
might enact a prospective ban on future programs.  Or a state might exempt existing
programs from such a ban.  These situations are discussed in further detail, infra note
326.
20. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265.
21. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
22. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Bakke, 438 U.S.
265; David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial
Conservatism or Conservative Justices, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (1991).  See also Seth D.
Harris, Innocence and The Sopranos, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 577 (2005), for an interest-
ing discussion of the rhetoric of “innocence.”
23. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997).
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1970) (upholding city’s closure of
city pools rather than desegregate); Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2004)
(upholding segregation of prisoners by race in California for first 60 days of confine-
ment), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000)
(striking down University of Texas law school affirmative action program); Econ. Equity,
122 F.3d 692 (upholding voter initiative ending affirmative action in California).
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otype must be implemented in reviews of measures ending affirma-
tive action programs.
This Note argues that because the Equal Protection Clause is
being enforced unequally by courts in affirmative action cases, strict
scrutiny should be applied to actions implementing and ending af-
firmative action programs, and a new test to detect impermissible
purposes should be adopted.  Part II briefly examines the history of
racial discrimination during the life of the Equal Protection Clause
and the history and underlying policies of affirmative action.  Part
III explains the “anti-racism principle” and its application by courts
in affirmative action cases, particularly focusing on Coalition for Eco-
nomic Equity v. Wilson.26  The arguments for strict scrutiny and a
new test are analyzed in Part IV.  Equal opportunity for all can only
be protected by an equal application of the principles underlying
the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. RACE AND AMERICAN LIFE
A. An Extremely Brief History of Racism and Discrimination in
the United States
To understand the challenge presented by affirmative action
cases to courts today, it is necessary to understand how race has
affected the history and politics of American life during the years
since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Despite the ef-
forts of many, race continues to affect all aspects of life in the
United States.27  During the period from the end of the Civil War to
the achievements of the civil rights movement, race was openly a
factor in the social and political unequal treatment of citizens.  Af-
ter the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, racism still played a large
26. 122 F.3d 692.
27. This is not to suggest “color-blindness” or homogenization should be values
that we aspire to achieve as a nation.  There are significant social, cultural, and identity
issues involved with how race should be perceived, acknowledged, and treated by soci-
ety and government, particularly where diversity is found to be a value worth pursuing.
This is notwithstanding how dubious race is as a concept. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez,
The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing race as a social construct); Carrie Lynn H.
Okizaki, Comment, “What Are You?”: Hapa-Girl and Multiracial Identity, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 463 (2000) (discussing Critical Race Theory and the inadequacy of racial
definitions).
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part in the unequal treatment of minorities, although racists have
learned to hide behind “coded” language and politics.  An area
where the development of the law has been corrupted by this une-
qual treatment is in the disparate treatment of the laws instituting
affirmative action programs and the measures repealing them.
1. From the Civil War to Civil Rights
The Civil War and its aftermath marked the end of institution-
alized slavery.28 It was, however, merely the beginning of a long
struggle to achieve not only the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaran-
tee of equal protection,29 but social, political, and economic equal-
ity as well.30  Although some framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment sought to give freedmen social as well as legal equality,
most thought of African-Americans as socially inferior, preferring
to continue segregation, anti-miscegenation laws, and other prac-
tices aimed at ensuring the superiority of the white race.31  Indeed,
although the Fourteenth Amendment was passed to counteract the
passage of “Black Codes,” which were laws designed to maintain the
social order that existed under slavery,32 later “Jim Crow” laws en-
sured the subjugation of African-Americans into the twentieth cen-
tury.33  Most interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment
28. Slaves in rebellious areas of the United States were freed by President Lin-
coln’s Emancipation Proclamation as of January 1, 1963. See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, GREAT
SPEECHES 98 (Stanley Appelbaum ed., Dover Publ’ns 1991).  Slaves in all of the United
States were freed via the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
29. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. See also Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understand-
ing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
30. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1988).
31. See Bickel, supra note 29. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896):
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to en-
force social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.
32. Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36
AKRON L. REV. 671, 681-85 (2003). See also Bickel, supra note 29 (discussing Fourteenth
Amendment as a means to counteract “Black Codes”); FONER, supra note 30 (describing
the history of Reconstruction).
33. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREE-
DOM 224-38 (6th ed., McGraw-Hill 1988); MICHAEL L. LEVINE, AFRICAN AMERICANS &
CIVIL RIGHTS: FROM 1919 TO PRESENT (Oryx Press 1996); Ronald L. F. Davis, Creating Jim
Crow: In-Depth Essay, at http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/history/creating2.htm (last
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following Reconstruction cemented this pattern of oppression,34 all
the while hiding behind the rhetoric of “separate but equal.”35
Other races were subjected to oppression as well.  Chinese im-
migrants were excluded from becoming citizens until 1943.36  Most
other Asian immigrants were not given the right to become citizens
until 1952.37  In addition to the prohibition on citizenship, Asians
were discriminated against in getting permits for businesses,38 sent
to segregated schools,39 not allowed to marry persons of a different
race,40 and interned by the hundreds of thousands during World
War II.41  Native Americans were nearly exterminated in the after-
math of the Civil War.42  Latinos were the target of discrimination
viewed on February 28, 2004) (describing the general history of Jim Crow in the United
States).
34. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 390-92 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).  Marshall points to specific examples of the Court “strangl[ing] Congress’
efforts . . . to promote racial equality,” id. at 391, such as The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883), and Plessy, 163 U.S. 537.
35. See Plessy, 163 U.S. 537.
36. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed
1943).  By 1940, this prohibition was expanded to all non-white aliens not from Africa
or the Western Hemisphere — in other words, all Asians with the exception of certain
Philipinos.  The Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876; 54 Stat. 1137 (1940) (amended 1943).
Chinese immigrants were allowed citizenship in 1943, The Chinese Repealer Act of
Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (1943), largely as a result of the embarrassment of
the United States in discriminating against citizens of an important ally against the Japa-
nese in World War II.  Although the ban on immigration was lifted, the annual quota
on Chinese naturalization was limited to 105 Chinese immigrants until all quotas were
ended in 1965.  Miriam Kim, Notes and Comments, Discrimination in the Wen Ho Lee
Case: Reinterpreting the Intent Requirement in Constitutional and Statutory Race Discrimination
Cases, 9 ASIAN L.J. 117, 123 n.32 (2002).
37. Gabriel J. Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Com-
munity of Justice, a Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129,
143-45 (1996).
38. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
39. See, e.g., Chin et al., supra note 37, n.75 (citing Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78
(1927)).
40. Id., n.74 (“For instance, California’s anti-miscegenation law was not repealed
until 1948. See HYUNG-CHAN KIM, DICTIONARY OF ASIAN AMERICAN HISTORY 137 (1986).”)
See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s anti-miscegena-
tion law).
41. Chin et al., supra note 37, at 147-48. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
42. See, e.g., JOHN SELBY, THE CONQUEST OF THE WEST 199-240 (Rowman & Little-
field 1976); DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (Henry Holt 2001); Wil-
liam Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an
American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2002).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 8 29-APR-05 9:37
1180 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
as well, such as “mass deportations” in the 1930s.43  The condition
and struggle of minorities in the United States between the Civil
War and the Civil Rights movement has been documented in popu-
lar books,44 film,45 and music.46
During this period, the language and rhetoric of racism was
clear, as was the intent behind it.47  Words like “nigger,” “darkie,”
“coloreds,” “coolie,” “Chinaman,” “nip,” “Jap,” “wetback,” “kike,”
“Hebe,” “wop,” were all said openly, and without much in the way of
social consequence.48  Language maintained the existing social or-
der by its dehumanization of minorities.49  The law for the most
part reinforced the existing social order through the endorsement
of segregation.50  Occasionally, however, in cases involving unequal
43. Nancy Cervantes, et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in the Aftermath of Proposition
187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
44. See, e.g., WALTER MOSLEY, DEVIL IN A BLUE DRESS (Pocket Books 1990); HARPER
LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Warner Books 1982) (1960); MARK TWAIN, THE ADVEN-
TURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (Penguin 2003) (1884); LANGSTON HUGHES, SELECTED
POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES (Vintage Classics 1990).
45. See, e.g., ROSEWOOD (Warner Bros. 1997); DANCES WITH WOLVES (MGM 1990);
COME SEE THE PARADISE (20th Century Fox 1990); SHOW BOAT (Universal 1936).
46. See, e.g., TALIB KWELI, Four Women, on TRAIN OF THOUGHT (Priority 2000);
2PAC, Panther Power, on THE LOST TAPES (Lightyear 2000); CAST RECORDING, Ol’ Man
River, on SHOW BOAT (Quality Records 1994).
47. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME
WORD (Pantheon Books 2002); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION (Perennial 1988); Rhoda J. Yen, Racial Stereotyping of Asians and Asian Amer-
icans and Its Effect on Criminal Justice: A Reflection on the Wayne Lo Case, 7 ASIAN L.J. 1, 6
n.24 (2000) (describing the origin of the term “Yellow Peril”); BUGS BUNNY NIPS THE
NIPS (Warner Bros. 1940); ROSEWOOD (Warner Bros. 1997).
48. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT
WOUND (Westview Press 2004); KENNEDY, supra note 47; MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES
OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (Penguin 2003) (1884); SCHOOL TIES (Paramount 1992).
49. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 47; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 48.
50. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537.  Even Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy recognized that the
basis of segregation laws was “[t]he white race deem[ing] itself to be the dominant race
in this country,” id. at 559, and seeking to maintain that position. Id.  Even as he goes
on to write that the Constitution is “color-blind,” and knows no classes, Justice Harlan
has faith that the white race will continue to dominate so long as it “remains true to its
great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.” Id.  His words
may be truer than he realized, for the use of his dissenting words in Plessy has led to the
invalidation of much legislation aimed at undoing the effects of the discrimination
Harlan was opposed to. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Plessy,
163 U.S. 537).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 9 29-APR-05 9:37
2005] JUDICIAL BIAS IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 1181
political privilege51 and obvious discriminatory enforcement,52 the
Court enforced the Equal Protection Clause so as to protect minor-
ity groups against discrimination.  The root of the “anti-racism”
doctrine lies in these cases.53
“Separate but equal” was still good law in 1948 when President
Truman desegregated the U.S. military.54  President Truman’s
adoption of the civil rights cause alienated southern Democrats,
causing a walkout during the 1948 Democratic National Conven-
tion.55  Even with the desegregation of the military, achieving civil
rights was slow to come; segregation was still the law, even in the
nation’s capital.56  In 1954, as the result of litigation by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”),
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education57 held that segre-
51. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).  The privilege in this
case was the right to be included in a jury pool.  The majority uses interesting language
in describing the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment:
It was well known that in some States laws making such discriminations
then existed, and others might well be expected. The colored race, as a race,
was abject and ignorant, and in that condition was unfitted to command the respect
of those who had superior intelligence.  Their training had left them mere children,
and as such they needed the protection which a wise government extends to those who
are unable to protect themselves.  They especially needed protection against
unfriendly action in the States where they were resident.  It was in view of
these considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and adopted.
Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356.
53. See infra discussion Part III-A.  Interview with David Chang, Professor of Law,
New York Law School, in New York, NY (Feb. 3, 2004).
54. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
55. Adam Clymer, Divisive Words: News Analysis: G.O.P.’s 40 Years of Juggling on Race,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A1.  Then Governor of South Carolina, Strom Thurmond,
split from the Democratic Party to run for President to protect “states’ rights” to segre-
gate on the basis of race. Id.; The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow, at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/
jimcrow/stories_events_truman.html (last visited on Feb. 14, 2005).
56. See Letter from Stewart A. Street, U.S. Army Reservist, to Harry S Truman,
President of the United States (January 2, 1951) (on file at the Truman Presidential
Museum and Library), available at  http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/
study_collections/desegregation/large/1951/daf50-2.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
Mr. Street wrote to the President about having had his college education cut short. Id.
Although the Army may have been integrated, upon returning home from his fight for
democracy, he would again live in a segregated society. Id.  Mr. Street surmised that the
President probably did not think about racial conflict. Id.  Then Street wrote, “But it
does enter my mind, not only in brief moments, but for twenty-four hours a day.  You
see Mr. Truman, I am a Negro.” Id.
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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gated “educational facilities were inherently unequal.”58  Over the
following decade, the struggle for civil rights played out across the
United States, in private life,59 in public lives,60 in the courts,61  and
in Congress,62 culminating in some respects with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.63  With the Civil Rights Act outlawing discrimination in
public accommodations,64 federal programs,65 and in private em-
ployment,66 all that remained was for minorities to achieve actual
equality.
2. From Civil Rights to the Millennium
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, President
Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246 which began federal affirm-
ative action in contracting,67 as a way of effectuating Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.68  President Johnson said about affirmative action:
58. Id. at 496.  Interestingly, Justice Warren focuses on the psychological harm
done to the plaintiffs. Id.  He never actually overrules Plessy’s separate but equal doc-
trine, merely anything in Plessy that contradicts the finding that segregation “denot[es]
the inferiority of the negro group,” id. at 494-95 (cite omitted).  If some manner of
segregation were to be found equal, theoretically under Brown, it might be allowed to
stand, although it may still run afoul of the anti-racism principle in cases like Strauder,
100 U.S. 303, Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356, and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
For a recent example of segregation being upheld, see Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d
791 (9th Cir. 2003) (permitting the segregation of prisoners by race during first 60 days
of confinement), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).
59. See, e.g., JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE (Penguin 1988).
60. See, e.g., MALCOM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOM X (Grove
Press 1965); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. (Warner 1998); WILLIAMS, supra note 59.
61. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
62. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1606-07 (1964) (statement of Rep. Curtis regarding
Republican reaction to the proposed civil rights act); 110 CONG. REC. 12640-43 (1964)
(debate regarding counterfilibuster and amendment to the civil rights act).
63. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2004)).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
67. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-65), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2004).
68. See Harvey Gee, Why Did Asian Americans Vote Against the 1996 California Civil
Rights Initiative?, 2 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 14 n.55 (2001) (citing Carl E. Brody Jr., A
Historical View of Affirmative Action and the Interpretation of Its Legislative Intent by the Su-
preme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291, 300 (1996)).
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You do not take a person who, for years, has been hob-
bled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the start-
ing line of a race and then say, “you are free to compete
with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have
been completely fair.
Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportu-
nity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through
those gates.69
Over the next thirty years, affirmative action would be both widely
implemented and challenged.70  Meanwhile, as minority groups
tried to take advantage of new opportunities, they still faced the
continuing effects of past racial discrimination.71
Some of those continuing effects were, and still are, reflected
in the place that minorities occupy in society.  Blacks and Hispanics
have poverty rates twice that of whites.72  Minorities, especially
blacks, are disproportionately unemployed.73  Inner city, predomi-
nately minority schools lag behind their whiter, suburban counter-
69. Commencement Address at Howard University, 1965 Pub. Papers 635-40
(1966), reprinted in Lyndon Baines Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights: Commencement
Address at Howard University, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR REVERSE DIS-
CRIMINATION? 57 (Francis J. Beckwith & Todd E. Jones eds., 1997).
70. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (challenge to University of
Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (challenge to University of Michigan’s undergraduate affirmative action pro-
gram); Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (challenge to federal law
requiring affirmative action in subcontracting); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990) (challenge to minority preference in license applications); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (challenge to 30% set-aside in city contracting);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (challenge to affirmative action in
a lay-off provision in an employment contract); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980) (challenge to 10% federal set-aside for public works); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (challenge to University of California’s affirmative
action program); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000) (challenge to Univer-
sity of Texas School of Law’s affirmative action program); Coalition for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (challenge to voter initiative ending affirmative
action in California).
71. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 390-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at
552 (acknowledging that past racial discrimination may have present effects, citing Fulli-
love, 448 U.S. at 518).
72. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002 2 (2003), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pub/p60-222.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Janny Scott, Nearly Half Of Black Men Found Jobless, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2004, at B1.
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parts.74  They are typically underrepresented in post-secondary
education.75  Minorities are incarcerated at higher rates than
whites, while being underrepresented politically.76  They tend to
live in segregated neighborhoods.77  People of color are the victims
of discriminatory policing78 and official indifference.79  They are
74. See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S
SCHOOLS (Crown Pub. 1991).
75. See JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002 4 (2003) (blacks achieve bachelor degrees at half the rates
of whites); Cecilia A. Conrad, Affirmative Action and Admission to the University of Califor-
nia, in IMPACTS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLICIES AND CONSEQUENCES IN CALIFORNIA 171
(Paul Ong, ed. 1999).  In California, although 7.4% of high school graduates are Afri-
can American and 23.3% are Latino, those groups only comprise 6.6% and 12.9% re-
spectfully of the postsecondary enrollment. Id.  Fewer minority students take the steps
to apply to post secondary education and, when they do, have lower scores than whites
on average. Id.
76. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2003 9(1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p03.pdf.  In 2003, 44.08% of federal and state
prison inmates were non-Hispanic black, while 18.73% were Hispanic, compared with
35.01% being non-Hispanic white.  Compare this with population rates of 12.95% for
blacks, 13.71% for Hispanics, and 81.74% for whites in 2003.  U.S. Census Bureau, An-
nual Estimates of the Population by Sex, Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin for the United
States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2003 (2003), at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/
asrh/NC-EST2003/NC-EST2003-03.pdf.  These statistics are illustrated in the following
chart:
White Black Hispanic
Prison Population Rate 35.01% 44.08% 18.73%
US Population Rate 81.74% 12.95% 13.71%
In other words, blacks comprised a percentage of the prison population at four times
their representation in the general population.  If blacks in 2004 were represented at
that rate in the Senate, there would have been forty-four black Senators instead of zero.
In 2005, Barak Obama of Illinois was seated as just the third black senator since Recon-
struction, and fifth ever.  Cheryl Gay Stolberg, In Congress, Raising Hands Before Rolling
Up Sleeves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A20 (reporting the swearing in ceremony for the
new Congress); Robin Toner & Katherine Q. Seelye, Republicans Add Seats in South:
Obama Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at A1 (reporting Mr. Obama’s victory over Alan
Keyes); Naftali Bendavid, Primary Colors: 40 Years After the Voting Rights Act, Most Ameri-
cans Still See Politics in Black and White, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 2004, at Magazine C17 (not-
ing that two African Americans were appointed during Reconstruction, and two others,
Edward Brooke and Carol Moseley Braun, were elected).
77. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993), cited by Denise C. Morgan, The Less
Polite Questions: Race, Place, Poverty, and Public Education, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 267, 279
n.34 (1998).
78. See, e.g., Ira Glasser, Speech: American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L.
REV. 703 (2000).
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unlikely to be federal judges.80  Life expectancy among blacks still
lags behind whites.81  The continuing effects of race as a factor in
American life have been examined in television and movies,82
plays,83 music,84 and literature.85
Along with the continuing effects of past racial discrimination,
new challenges confronted minorities as the millennium ap-
proached and passed.  The crack epidemic in inner-cities tore a
hole in black communities;86 in Washington, D.C., children were
79. See, e.g., James Dao, Ohio Town’s Water at Last Runs Past a Color Line, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2004 at A1:
“The denial of water service ‘wasn’t in your face racism,’” said Vincent
Curry, executive director of Fair Housing Advocates Association, a group
based in Akron that helped the residents file their complaint.  “This was
more, ‘We won’t respond to you because we don’t care about you.’”
80. Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice For All, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
1109, 1111-12 (2003), cited in Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal.
2004).  Judge Chen cites the following statistics:
Of the nearly 1,600 active federal judges (including Article III judges, part-
and full-time magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges, and court of claims
judges) as of September 30, 2001, 7.2% were African American, 4.0% were
Latina/o, 0.8% were Asian American, and 0.1% were Native American.
None were Pacific Islanders. Among minority judges, women of color were
substantially underrepresented. In contrast, according to the 2000 census,
African Americans were 12.3% of the U.S. population, Latinas/os were
12.5%, Asian Pacific Americans were 3.7%, and Native Americans were
0.9%.
Id. at 1111-12 (citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., Linda Villarosa, The Racial Divide: As Black Men Move into Middle Age,
Dangers Rise, N.Y. TIMES, September 23, 2002, at F1.
82. See, e.g., BAMBOOZLED (New Line 2000); SAVE THE LAST DANCE (Paramount
Pictures 2001); BOYZ N THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991); The West Wing: Mr. Willis of
Ohio (NBC television broadcast) (dramatizing White House and American politics,
often involving questions of race); Law & Order: Bounty (NBC television broadcast) (ep-
isode in which defendant uses stigmatization of affirmative action as a mitigation de-
fense to murder); THE TEST (Flickering Duck Producktions 1999) (two minorities
struggle in affluent white school).
83. See, e.g., JOHN LEGUIZAMO, FREAK: A SEMI-DEMI-QUASI-PSEUDO AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(Riverhead 1997); LEROI JONES, DUTCHMAN AND THE SLAVE: TWO PLAYS (William Mor-
row 1971) (1964).
84. See, e.g., THE ROOTS, THINGS FALL APART (MCA Records 1999); COMMON, ONE
DAY IT’LL ALL MAKE SENSE (Relativity Records 1997); WU TANG CLAN, ENTER THE WU
TANG (36 CHAMBERS) (RCA 1993).
85. See, e.g., WALTER MOSLEY, ALWAYS OUTNUMBERED, ALWAYS OUTGUNNED (Pocket
Books 1998); AMY TAN, THE JOY LUCK CLUB (Prentice Hall 1990); CHANG-RAE LEE, NA-
TIVE SPEAKER (Riverhead Books 1996).
86. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Murder Rate Plunges in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1995, at sec. 1, pg 1 (discussing the end of the crack epidemic as a reason for the fall in
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planning their own funerals.87  In California, voter initiatives at-
tempted to end bilingual education,88 public services to illegal im-
migrants, and affirmative action.89  Following the passage of
Proposition 209 in California, legislatures in other states unsuccess-
fully attempted to end affirmative action programs.90  Five other
states attempted ballot initiatives, with only Washington voters pass-
ing their initiative.91  A failed California ballot initiative in 2003
tried to end the tracking of racial statistics.92  The effect of the Cali-
fornia proposition would have been to make the compilation of sta-
tistics by racial categories difficult, if not impossible, rendering any
policy debates about race in California blind, as well as making it
impossible to measure compliance with a number of anti-discrimi-
nation laws.93
the murder rate from a high of 2,245 in 1990); Rich Connell, The Hidden Devastation of
Crack: The Epidemic is Eating Away Everyone’s Quality of Life, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at
A1 (one in a series outlining the effects of the crack epidemic in Los Angeles).
87. DeNeen L. Brown, Getting Ready to Die Young: Children in Violent D.C. Neighbor-
hoods Plan Their Own Funerals, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1993, at A1, quoted in Speech of
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, in Memphis, Tennessee (Nov.
13, 1993), in IN OUR OWN WORDS 405 (Robert Torricelli & Andrew Carroll eds., 1999)
(speaking extemporaneously before an audience of black ministers on what Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. would say if he were alive to address the audience).
88. See William Ryan, Note, The Unz Initiatives and the Abolition of Bilingual Educa-
tion, 43 B.C. L. REV 487, 499-501 (2002) (explaining the history of Proposition 227 in
California).
89. See LYDIA CHA´VEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA’S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (Univ. of Cal. Press 1998).  Proposition 187 was passed in 1994, ending public
schooling and hospital care for illegal immigrants, id., although a federal district court
held that federal law preempted most of the provisions of 187.  League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Wilson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3418 (1998) (holding that the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1601,
preempts the state initiative).  In 1996, Proposition 209 was passed in California, ending
state affirmative action programs.  The amendment to the California constitution was
upheld in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied
522 U.S. 963 (1997).
90. Jodi Miller, Affirmative Action: “Democracy in Free Fall”: The Use of Ballot Initiatives
to Dismantle State-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 9
(1999).
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., John M. Broder, The California Recall: The Overview, Davis is Out,
Shwarzenegger is in by Big Margins in California Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at A1.
93. Id.
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Since Strom Thurmond’s walkout during the 1948 Democratic
Convention,94 race and racial issues have been convenient political
tools — “wedge issues” — for splitting blocks of voters.95  Efforts to
increase minority political power have met with resistance.96  In the
1988 Presidential election, there was the notorious “Willie Horton”
advertisement.97  In 1996, both Governor Pete Wilson of California,
running for the Republican nomination for President, and the
eventual nominee, Bob Dole, pushed Proposition 209 as a means of
splitting Democrats in California.98  In the 2000 primaries, then
Governor Bush’s campaign visited Bob Jones University, which at
the time banned interracial dating,99 and allegedly spread a story in
South Carolina that opponent Senator John McCain had a black
daughter.100  In Florida during the 2000 election, minorities faced
greater difficulty in exercising their franchise, including allegations
94. Adam Clymer, Divisive Words: News Analysis: G.O.P.’s 40 Years of Juggling on Race,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A1.
95. See CHA´VEZ, supra note 89; Clymer, supra note 94.  The “wedge” works by tak-
ing voters who agree on issue A, and splitting them along another issue, B, so that the
unified block in favor of A dissolves along new lines around B, the effect of which is
usually to give the opponents of issue A victory in that issue.
96. Sheryl G. Snyder, The Future of Affirmative Action: Gratz and Grutter in Context,
92 KY. L.J. 241, 246-248 (2003/2004) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Geor-
gia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003)).  In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court examined
whether the unpacking of blacks from “super majority/minority” voting districts to “in-
fluence” districts violated the Voting Rights Act. Id.  Ms. Snyder argues that the mainte-
nance of all white districts is important to the Republican party in maintaining its
majority in the House. Id.  Republican administrations’ Justice Departments refuse to
preclear redistricting that would be “sympathetic to minority interests” and, therefore,
also presumably Democratic. Id.
97. See, e.g., Elena R. Laskin, Note, How Parental Liability Statutes Criminalize and
Stigmatize Minority Mothers, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1200-01 (2000).  In the 1988 presi-
dential election, then Vice-President Bush was aided by an ad criticizing Massachusetts
Governor Michael Dukakis for allowing the furlough of Willie Horton. Id.  Horton,
who was black and a convicted murderer, raped a white woman while on furlough. Id.
The ad’s effectiveness was based on the stereotype that race is connected to crime,
coupled with the image of a black man raping a white woman. Id.; see also Clymer, supra
note 94.
98. CHA´VEZ, supra note 86.
99. See, e.g., Jonathan Tilove, Racial Policies at Stake in November, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Oct. 8, 2000, at Nat’l 9.
100. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Robert Redford, Now More than Ever: A 1972 Film About
Empty Politics, “The Candidate” is Ripe for a Sequel, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 20,
2003, at A-11 (editorial); Greg McDonald, McCain’s Reform Message Has Rivals Going to
Extremes, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 29, 2000, at A5.  Senator McCain’s adopted daugh-
ter is Bangladeshi.
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of police intimidation.101  In the 2004 election, there were numer-
ous stories regarding the alleged efforts of Republicans to suppress
the minority vote;102 while scattered reports persisted,103 these ef-
forts did not seem to materialize as feared.104
While racial issues have played an important part in politics,
bias has also played a role in the judicial process.  A recent chal-
lenge to the process for selecting grand jury forepersons in Califor-
nia revealed a complete exclusion of Chinese-Americans, Filipino-
Americans, and Latinos for over thirty years.105  Importantly, the
district court examining the challenge acknowledged “the perva-
siveness of unconscious racial and ethnic stereotyping and group
bias.”106  Judge Breyer cited to the extensive work of scholars and
others on unconscious stereotyping.107  Unconscious stereotyping is
not limited to the judicial process, but also affects the working con-
ditions of minorities,108 as well as other more personal aspects of
their lives.109
Not only has some racism retreated to the unconscious, but the
blatant racist rhetoric employed prior to the Civil Rights Act has
101. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro & Somini Sengupta, Contesting the Vote: Black Voters:
Arriving at Florida Voting Places, Some Blacks Found Frustration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000,
at A1.
102. See, e.g., Ruth Morris et al., Poll Watcher Find Few Problems, Firestorm Worries Don’t
Materialize, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 3, 2004, at Local 2B (describing fears
that Republican monitors would challenge minority voter eligibility); James Dao &
Adam Liptak, G.O.P. in Ohio Can Challenge Voters at Polls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at A1
(describing challenge to Republican poll monitors in Ohio).  The corresponding Re-
publican fear was that minorities were committing voter fraud. Id.
103. See Robert D. McFadden, Voters Find Long Lines and Short Tempers, but Little
Chaos at Polls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at P1 (reporting on scattered irregularities in
voting across the country).
104. See, e.g., id.; Morris et al., supra note 102 (reporting that few challenges to
voter eligibility were made).
105. Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (turning down
petitioner’s habeas appeal, but acknowledging need for greater scrutiny).
106. Id. at 906.
107. Id. at 906-07.
108. See FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE
OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 57-142 (1995) available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/
programs/history/reich/reports/ceiling.pdf (outlining difficulties of minorities in bus-
iness, partly due to stereotypes), cited by Chin, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 907.
109. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 317-19 (1987), cited by Chin, 343 F. Supp. 2d at
906.
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been submerged and replaced by a new rhetoric composed of code
words and symbols.  Perhaps the first use of racial coding was the
use of the term “states’ rights” as a means of expressing support for
segregation.110  The term would have a continuing power to appeal
to white voters, particularly in the south.111  This ciphering of racist
rhetoric was displayed in the Congressional reaction to the crack
epidemic,112 the debate over illegal immigration,113 and in the bat-
tles over welfare reform.114  Coded racist stereotypes are apparent
110. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 143-44 (2001); Inaugural Speech of George Wallace,
Governor of Alabama (Jan. 14, 1963), in IN OUR OWN WORDS 228 (Robert Torricelli &
Andrew Carroll eds., 1999) (promising “Segregation now!  Segregation tomorrow!  Seg-
regation forever!”).  Wallace’s speech is an excoriation of the federal government’s
moves toward civil rights.  He calls for greater respect of the powers of each state to
regulate as they please, presumably to restrict the rights of minorities. See also, 100
CONG. REC. 7,251-57 (1954) (remarks of Sen. Eastland) (speaking out against the
Court’s decision in Brown as usurping the states’ discretion to enforce the social ine-
quality between the races).  Senator Eastland notes: “There is no racial hatred in the
South.  The Negro Race is not an oppressed race.” Id. at 7,255.  He earlier asks, “What
about the white children?  Do they not, also, have rights?  Will not the commingling of
the races in public schools have a detrimental effect upon white children?” Id. at 7,252.
111. See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and
Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 84 n.135 (1991) (discussing Ronald Regan’s
use of the term “states’ rights” in Philadelphia, Mississippi (the scene of the slaying of
three civil rights workers in the 1960s), where the term was associated with white
supremacy); Clymer, supra note 94.
112. Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs During the Con-
gressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611 (2000).  Dvorak discusses how
coded phrases were used during the sentencing debates, how crack was not a problem
when it was being fought in the “burned out, abandoned buildings of our large metro-
politan areas” (where minorities are), but the war was a problem when it moved to
“country roads . . . in the tree-lined streets of small towns and villages” (where white
people live). Id at 654-655. See also Charisse Jones, Crack and Punishment: Is Race the
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995, at sec. 1, 1 (discussing racial controversy behind sen-
tencing guidelines for crack possession in contrast to powdered cocaine possession).
The article notes that although federal statistics indicated that half of crack users were
white, 90% of those convicted of federal crack offenses were black, compared with a
3.5% white conviction rate. Id.
113. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/
National Imagination, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1395 (1997); Kristen M. Schuler, Note, Equal
Protection and the Undocumented Immigrant, California’s Proposition 187, 16 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 275 (1996) (discussing ties between anti-immigrant movement and racism).
114. See, e.g., MARTIN GILES, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999); Linda Kelly, Reproduc-
tive Liberty Under the Threat of Care: Deputizing Private Agents and Deconstructing State Action,
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in media depictions of minorities and in everyday conversation.115
One of the issues where this is most apparent is in the current de-
bate over affirmative action.
B. An Extremely Brief History of Affirmative Action
Responding to the reality that merely ending state oppression
of minorities would not be enough to reverse the effects of nearly
180 years of racist policies, President Johnson issued Executive Or-
der 11,246, instituting federal affirmative action.116  President
Nixon expanded federal affirmative action plans, and states and lo-
calities began to build their own.117  Most of these initial plans saw
affirmative action as a remedial measure to counter the effects of
past discrimination.118  In addition to remedial purposes, educators
sought to overcome historic under-representation in certain profes-
sions, indirectly provide professional services to minority communi-
ties, and benefit from a diverse student body.119  While other policy
reasons for affirmative action programs exist,120 these four justifica-
5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 81, 102 (1998) (discussing “welfare reform” as a code word for
race because of the perception that it is predominately minorities who are on welfare).
115. Richard Delgado & Jean Stephanic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV 1258 (1992) (“Racism’s
victims become sensitized to its subtle nuances and code-words — the body language,
averted gazes, exasperated looks, terms such as ‘you people,’ ‘innocent whites,’ ‘highly
qualified black,’ ‘articulate’ and so on[.]”), cited in Dvorak, supra note 112. See also
CHRIS ROCK: BRING THE PAIN (HBO 1996) (talking about racism reflected in white reac-
tions to Colin Powell).
116. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-65), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2004).
117. Ward Thomas & Mark Garrett, U.S. and California Affirmative Action Policies,
Laws, and Programs, in IMPACTS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLICIES AND CONSEQUENCES IN
CALIFORNIA 34 (Paul Ong, ed. 1999).
118. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305-07 (1978)
(discussing the university’s asserted reasons for its affirmative action program), Com-
mencement Address at Howard University, 1965 Pub. Papers 635-40 (1966), reprinted in
Lyndon Baines Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights: Commencement Address at Howard
University, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION? 57
(Francis J. Beckwith & Todd E. Jones eds., 1997), cited in Jodi Miller, Affirmative Action:
“Democracy in Free Fall”: The Use of Ballot Initiatives to Dismantle State-Sponsored Affirmative
Action Programs, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 13 (1999).
119. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 (discussing University’s justifications for its
program).
120. For example, affirmative action in the private sector may more closely connect
a business with the community it serves, or allow a business to benefit from the percep-
tion that it is minority friendly. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (cit-
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tions are significant due to their consideration by the Supreme
Court.121
In 1978, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the Univer-
sity of California’s medical school affirmative action program in Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke.122  While striking down
the use of quotas, the Court upheld the use of race as a plus factor
in admissions decisions.123  Likewise, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the
Court upheld the remedial use of affirmative action in a federal
contracting scheme.124  Thereafter, the two seemingly permissible
uses of affirmative action were either to advance educational diver-
sity or to specifically redress past discrimination by the state.125
The effects of implementing and ending affirmative action
programs have been studied.  In Los Angeles, an affirmative action
program implemented before the Croson decision produced an al-
most fivefold increase from previous minority participation in local
contracts.126  The same types of effects were observed in affirmative
ing amici briefs of corporations).  Likewise, in the military, the appearance of
discrimination by the under-representation of minorities in command positions led to
tensions, while a diverse command structure was beneficial to morale.  Brief for Amici
Curiae Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241, 02-516).
121. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
122. 438 U.S. 265.
123. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-18 (favorably discussing Harvard’s diversity plan).
124. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
125. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (upholding University of Michigan Law School’s affirma-
tive action program); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down University
of Michigan’s undergraduate affirmative action program); Adarand Constr., Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (requiring strict scrutiny under Fifth Amendment equal pro-
tection claims); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding minority
preference in license applications); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (striking down a 30% set-aside in city contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down a lay-off provision in an employment
contract).
126. Tom Larson, Affirmative Action Programs for Minority- and Women-Owned Busi-
nesses, in IMPACTS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLICIES AND CONSEQUENCES IN CALIFORNIA
144 (Paul Ong, ed. 1999) [hereinafter IMPACTS] (showing an increase in total dollar
amounts awarded to minority owned firms from 2.2% to 11.8%).  Although gains were
made previous to the Croson decision, following Croson, 488 U.S. 469, minority participa-
tion declined moderately as the affirmative action policy was modified to comply with
the Court’s requirements. Id. at 145.  Despite these increases, minority businesses are
still underutilized. Id.
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action programs in Florida and Connecticut.127  Moreover, a survey
of disparity studies shows that while overall there is a gap between
the amount minority businesses would be expected to receive based
on their representation, that gap is larger in cities without affirma-
tive action programs than in cities with such programs.128  In educa-
tion, ending affirmative action has produced dramatic effects on
minority admission and enrollment.129  For example, following the
end of affirmative action at the University of California, Latino ad-
missions to Boalt Hall dropped by 50% and African Americans by
80%.130  None of the blacks admitted to Boalt Hall enrolled;131 the
only black student to enter Boalt Hall in 1997 had deferred entry
from the previous year.132
Despite the beneficial effects of affirmative action programs to
minority groups and the harmful results of ending those programs,
affirmative action continues to come under attack.  California’s ef-
fort to end affirmative action through the California Civil Rights
Initiative (“CCRI”)133 is an informative example.  Following the ef-
127. Id.  In Tallahassee, Florida, an affirmative action program increased minority
participation from zero contracts to 24% of all city construction contracts. Id.  In New
Haven, Connecticut, minority participation increased from 1% to 25% of the city con-
tracts. Id.
128. Id., citing MARIA E. ENCHAUTEGUI ET AL., DO MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES GET
A FAIR SHARE OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS? (The Urban Institute 1997).  In cities with-
out an affirmative action program, only 45% of the expected dollar  amount goes to
minority businesses, as opposed to 57% in cities with programs. Id.
129. See, e.g., Paul Ong, Proposition 209 and Its Implications, in IMPACTS, supra note
126, at 205-06 (stating that following the ending of affirmative action at the University
of California, new registration by minorities fell by 30% at UCLA and 52% at Berkeley,
the most competitive campuses, and systemwide by 10%); Jennifer L. Shea, Percentage
Plans: An Inadequate Substitute for Affirmative Action in Higher Education Admissions, 78 IND.
L.J. 587 (2003) (outlining the effects replacing affirmative action programs in Florida,
Texas, and California with so-called “percentage plans” which guarantee admission to
some top percentage of a state’s graduating high school class).
130. See, e.g., LYDIA CHA´VEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA’S BATTLE TO END AFFIRM-
ATIVE ACTION 254 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1998); Danny Feingold, Test Tube for a Changing
Political Climate, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997, at E1.
131. Jessica Marie Delgado, Commentary: The Courage I Know, 13 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 7, 8 (1998).
132. Id.
133. The California Civil Rights Initiative, eventually on the ballot as Proposition
209, amended the California Constitution to state: “The state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race,
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
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fect that endorsing the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 had on Gov-
ernor Pete Wilson’s re-election campaign and presidential
aspirations, supporters of the CCRI saw an opportunity to split the
Democratic vote in California and end affirmative action.134
Whites, men in particular, were feeling dissatisfied at what they saw
as opportunities lost to minorities because of affirmative action.135
The political advantages of supporting an end to affirmative action
were confirmed when Governor Wilson’s approval rating increased
after helping to engineer the end of the affirmative action pro-
grams at the University of California.136  Soon other Republican
politicians jumped on the CCRI bandwagon, ultimately gathering
the signatures to put the CCRI on the ballot as Proposition 209.137
Opposing affirmative action by way of supporting Proposition
209 was seen as an effective way to get the white vote.138  Moreover,
minorities were confused by the language of Proposition 209 and
what its effects would be;139 most voters did not know it would end
affirmative action.140  As the debate became more polarized, the
real issues became clouded.141  Supporters of the measure could
134. CHA´VEZ, supra note 130, at 37-47.
135. Id. at 39-47.
136. Id. at 66-67.  Wilson’s orchestration of the University of California meetings
and his refusal to compromise or consent to further study despite widespread support
among University of California regents, students, faculty, and alumni were all based on
political strategy. Id. at 62-66.  Wilson gained a five point jump in his national approval
ratings in his bid for the 1994 Republican Presidential nomination. Id. at 67.  Many of
the predicted drops in minority enrollment at University of California campuses came
to pass.  Editorial, Prop. 209 Lands on U.C., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1998, at B6.
137. CHA´VEZ, supra note 130, at 73-76.
138. Id. at 111-12.  Jesse Helms had used the issue in 1990. Id.  Pat Buchanan had
exploited the race issue to win the New Hampshire primary. Id. at 113.  Even Bob Dole,
who had long been a supporter of affirmative action programs, backed the CCRI. Id. at
116-17.
139. Id. at 195.
140. Id. at 153.
141. Id. at 198-203 (discussing the effects of racist David Duke’s campaigning for
the CCRI and the opponents’ subsequent response).  Duke, campaigning on behalf of
Proposition 209 stated: “The founding elements of this country . . . the basis of this
nation was created primarily by white Europeans.  And we should not be second class
citizens in our own country.  We should not face discrimination in the fabric of which
we created.” Id. at 202.
This reasoning is often heard in various forms from white opponents of affirmative
action.  What this ignores is that racist policies enabled the slave economy in the south,
the acquisition of territory by the conquest of the Native Americans, and that the
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easily talk about “fairness” and “preferences” as violating equality
principles, leaving supporters of affirmative action explaining con-
cepts like the continuing effects of past discrimination, current dis-
crimination, and educational diversity to a skeptical majority.142
The supporters of Proposition 209 produced advertisements that
oversimplified issues, ignored racial discrimination against minori-
ties, and played to racial fears.143  Opponents of Proposition 209
resorted to advertisements about David Duke,144 various celebrity
radio spots, and an ad showing a female doctor being stripped by
continuing effects of these and other racist policies benefits whites disproportionately.
Instead, it focuses on whites’ claims on American history (ignoring the contributions of
people of color), so that while whites do not want to remain responsible for the racism
of the past, they wish to exclusively retain the benefits of that racism.
142. See id., at 207 (“More than changing anyone’s mind, the debates offered a
glimpse of how difficult it is to talk about complex issues in a political campaign.
Rather than exploring issues of race and discrimination, each side tried to make points
with the voter.”).
143. CHA´VEZ, supra note 130, at 216-17 (these advertisements mainly related to “re-
verse discrimination” against whites due to affirmative action):
Male Announcer: The following actually happened January 19th, 1994.
Camarena [white woman]:  The teacher said to me, “You have to leave.”
Male Announcer:  Because you’re white.
Camarena:  Yes.  Then I left.  (door slams shut — sound under-current)
Male Announcer:  As she went out the door, students laughed. (laughter
fades)  But for this young, widowed mother trying to enroll in a class at a
public college, racial quotas were no laughing matter.
Camarena:  I thought discrimination was illegal.
Male Announcer:  But the law allows preferential treatment
. . .
These programs are based not on merit, or even on need, but on race.
Janice Camarena Ingraham is white.  Her deceased husband was Mexican
American.
Camarena:  Recently our public school asked the race of my children.  I said
the human race.
Id. at 217 (emphasis in original).  The community college where Camarena attended
disputed the facts of the story. Id. at 216.  It is notable how the ad attributes
Camarena’s being asked to leave to a “racial quota,” although none in fact existed.  The
ad mentions the word “quota” three times, although quotas had been illegal since
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, in 1978.
144. David Duke was Grand Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in the
1970s, elected to political office in the Louisiana legislature in 1989, and ran unsuccess-
fully for national office numerous times.  Anti-Defamation League, David Duke: In His
Own Words, at http://www.adl.org/special_reports/duke_own_words/duke_intro.asp
(last visited February 27, 2005).  He is regarded as a white supremacist. Id.  According
to Duke, he “has dedicated his life to the freedom and heritage of European American
peoples.”  David Duke’s European American Home Page, About David Duke, at http://
www.davidduke.com/index.php?p=90 (last visited February 27, 2005).
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men, representing what women had to lose if affirmative action en-
ded.145  In the end, California voters passed Proposition 209, 54.6%
in favor to 45.4% opposed.146
Exit polls showed how racially polarized the vote was.  Men and
whites favored the measure, whites overwhelmingly so.147  Women
were narrowly opposed.148  Blacks, Asian Americans, and Latinos,
although only a small segment of voters, all strongly opposed Pro-
position 209.149  Interestingly, as the income levels of voters rose, so
did the level of support for the measure.150  Republicans and in-
dependents, a combined 52% of the voters, strongly favored Pro-
position 209, while 69% of Democrats, representing 21% of voters,
opposed the measure.151
Following the passage of Proposition 209, numerous states at-
tempted to end affirmative action through initiatives and legisla-
tion, with only Washington succeeding.152  Proposition 209 and
voter initiatives are not the only challenges to affirmative action.  In
Florida, Governor Jeb Bush issued an executive order ending af-
firmative action.153  Recently, lawsuits regarding affirmative action
in education were heard in several circuits and the Supreme
Court,154  and a court struck down San Francisco’s affirmative ac-
145. CHA´VEZ, supra note 130, at 227-33.
146. Id., at 235.  9,657,195 Californians voted. Id.
147. Election ’96: State Propositions: A Snapshot of Voters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at
A29 [hereinafter Snapshot of Voters].  Males, representing 47% of all voters were 61% in
favor of the measure.  Whites, representing 74% of the voters, were 63% in favor of
Proposition 209.  Sixty-six percent of white men and 58% of white women voted for
Proposition 209. CHA´VEZ, supra note 130, at 239.
148. Snapshot of Voters, supra note 147.  Fifty-two percent of women were opposed to
the measure, and women were 53% of the voters.
149. Id.  Blacks were 7% of the voters and were 74% opposed to the measure.
Asian Americans were 5% of the voters, and were 61% opposed.  Latinos represented
10% of the voters, and were 76% opposed.
150. Id.  This could be a function of minorities making up larger proportions of the
lower income brackets, or people with larger incomes being opposed to the redistribu-
tion of opportunities, or both.
151. Id.  Republicans represented 38% of the voters, Independents 14%.  Republi-
cans were 80% in favor, Independents 59%.
152. Jodi Miller, Affirmative Action: “Democracy in Free Fall”: The Use of Ballot Initiatives
to Dismantle Stat-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 9 (1999).
153. Fla. Exec. Order 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999), cited in Shea, supra note 129, at 611
n.234.
154. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (upholding University of Michigan Law School’s af-
firmative action program); Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
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tion program as violating Proposition 209.155  Although the Su-
preme Court rulings in Grutter and Gratz have institutions and states
reconsidering how to implement their affirmative action policies in
admissions,156 opponents of affirmative action are considering chal-
lenges in new areas.157  For example, Ward Connerly, one of the
leaders in ending affirmative action in California, is seeking to insti-
tute voter initiatives in other states, such as Michigan.158  In the
coming years, there will likely be many legislative and judicial chal-
lenges to affirmative action programs.
III. HOW COURTS HAVE FAILED TO ENFORCE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION PRINCIPLES
As this brief history indicates, given the extent that race has
permeated social and political life in America, it is somewhat sur-
prising how ineffectively courts deal with issues of race.  The chang-
ing nature of racism and the sophistication of those with a racist
purpose have rendered courts unable to effectively enforce the anti-
racism principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment.  The suc-
cessful adoption of “equal rights” rhetoric by conservatives has not
only obfuscated the public debates over racial policies, but also con-
Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2000); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
155. Judge Overturns San Francisco Program, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2004, at A14.
156. See V. Dion Haynes, Bans on use of race get new scrutiny; Admissions rules in 4 states
face fresh challenge, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 25, 2003, at C11.
157. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action
and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289 (2001) (arguing that “percentage
plans,” although facially neutral, should be struck down under strict scrutiny); Christo-
pher M. Singer, Ruling Helps Michigan Anti-Affirmative Action Forces, DETROIT NEWS, June
13, 2004, at 1A; Elissa Gootman, Scholarship, ‘Whites Only,’ Roils a Campus, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2004 at A17 (reporting on a “whites only” scholarship meant to parody minor-
ity scholarships); Stuart Silverstein, Pepperdine Defends Its Minority Scholarships, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at B1 (discussing challenges to race-based scholarships and schol-
ars programs).  Mr. Fitzpatrick’s article is interesting for two reasons.  The first is that
his main normative concern with the Texas Ten Percent plan is with the disadvantage
to whites, as opposed to the fact that for the plan to function, it relies on the continuing
de facto segregation of Texas high schools.  The second reason is his willingness to
consider the motivations of a legislature in passing a facially neutral law that disadvan-
tages whites, something conservatives seem loath to do in laws that disadvantaged mi-
norities. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
158. Dean E. Murphy, Top Foe of Affirmative Action Leaves California Regents, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at A18.
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fused the formation of legal doctrines.  The current tests that the
Supreme Court uses to examine laws ending affirmative action pro-
grams do not effectively enforce the principles announced in
Strauder v. West Virginia159 and Yick Wo v. Hopkins.160  Courts are out
of touch with the realities facing people of color and need to refine
their understanding of the principles involved in these debates and
reformulate the legal analysis designed to protect citizens against
legislation with an impermissible purpose under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A. The Anti-Racism Principle of the Equal Protection Clause
Early in the jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court recognized that one of the fundamental purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause was to protect against “unfriendly
legislation” passed because of race,161 and discriminatory enforce-
ment of a facially neutral law.162  Thereafter, in Korematsu v. United
States,163 the Court set three Constitutional principles — two sub-
stantive and one adjudicative. Korematsu involved a challenge to an
order excluding Japanese Americans from “West Coast military ar-
eas.”164  In upholding the law, Justice Black, writing for the major-
ity, stated that while “pressing public necessity may sometimes
justify the existence of [racial classifications], racial antagonism
159. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
160. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
161. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.  It is worth noting the following statement of Justice
Strong:
The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a
necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the
colored race, — the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored, — exemption from legal discriminations, implying
inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the
rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing
them to the condition of a subject race.
Id. at 307-08 (emphasis added).  The Court later abandoned this statement, reasoning
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), that it was not the government’s place to
secure social equality so long as the equality principle was not being violated, even
though segregation laws may have been rooted in racial animus.
162. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74 (protecting against enforcement with “an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations be-
tween persons in similar circumstances[.]”).
163. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
164. Id. at 217.  The effect of the order was the forced relocation of Japanese-Amer-
icans to concentration camps.
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never can.”165  In dissent, Justice Murphy wrote that “assumption of
racial guilt,” or racial stereotype, is likewise impermissible.166  The
two substantive interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause in
Korematsu, stating action with a racist motive or stereotype is imper-
missible, combine to form the substantive “anti-racism principle.”167
To ensure the enforcement of the anti-racism principle, Black
writes that laws which “curtail the rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect . . . [and] courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny.”168  Although the Court in Korematsu ultimately failed
to apply the adjudicative standard it set, the substantive principle
and adjudicative standard would be further developed (and mud-
dled) by the Court in the following decades of Equal Protection
jurisprudence.169  These principles seem at odds with segregation,
but it was not until Brown v. Board of Education that segregation was
found inherently unequal.170
165. Id. at 215.
166. Id. at 235-36 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
167. See David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims:
Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 802 (1991).
168. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
169. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that affirmative
action in education is permissible); Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(holding that the federal government is not entitled to greater deference under the
Fifth Amendment’s equal protection analysis); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (introducing new substantive concerns into the equal protection
analysis, such as the innocent white victim); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that disproportionate impact can be evidence
of a discriminatory purpose); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (stating that
disproportionate impact does not itself trigger strict scrutiny); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down prohibitions on interracial marriage).
170. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  In Brown, Chief Justice Warren, in examining the consti-
tutionality of segregation in public schools, explored the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and found it inconclusive. Id. at 489.  Abandoning an examination of
original intent as unilluminating and distinguishing Plessy, Warren stated:
we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted,
or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present place in Amer-
ican life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protec-
tion of the laws.
Id. at 492-93.  Warren goes on to state that the psychological harm caused by segrega-
tion to minority children makes segregated schools unequal, and therefore unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 493-94.  Chief Justice Warren notably relies on “modern authorities” in his
determination, id. at 494 n.11, but never speaks as to whether segregation laws were
passed with an impermissible purpose.
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The Court’s jurisprudence in disproportionate impact cases
has further diluted the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment,
particularly with regard to facially neutral laws.  In Washington v.
Davis, the Court examined a challenge, based on a black failure
rate four times greater than that of whites, to the District of Colum-
bia’s Police Department personnel test.171  Writing for the majority,
Justice White stated that: “Standing alone, [disproportionate im-
pact] does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be
subjected to . . . strict scrutiny[.]”172  In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, however, the Court
clarified its examination of disproportionate impact cases.173  Al-
though a “discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause,” a discriminatory purpose
need not be the only factor motivating a state action.174  Even
among many factors, if discrimination was a “motivating factor,”
then a court should apply strict scrutiny.175  While disproportionate
impact is an important starting point in an examination of a legisla-
ture’s purpose, the judicial scrutiny requires a “sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be availa-
ble.”176  In both Davis and Arlington Heights, the Court concluded
there was not enough evidence of racist purposes to impose strict
judicial scrutiny of the facially neutral laws at issue.
In examining a racial classification in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, the Court had an opportunity to examine an
affirmative action program alleged to be discriminatory against
whites.177  Of the four purposes that the university used to defend
its program, Justice Powell, writing the opinion of the Court, found
two — redressing past discrimination and educational diversity —
permissible.178  Powell chose to apply strict scrutiny over Brennan’s
dissent, not to enforce the anti-racism principle, but because of
171. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
172. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (internal citations omitted).
173. 429 U.S. 252.
174. Id. at 265.
175. Id. at 265-66.
176. Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
177. 438 U.S. 265.
178. Id. at 305-15.  The other two, reducing historical under-representation and
increasing the number of doctors who serve underprivileged communities, were imper-
missible or unsupported by evidence. Id.
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concerns that affirmative action programs may reinforce stereo-
types and racism and because of the burden to the “innocent per-
sons” who bear no responsibility for past discrimination.179
Powell’s concerns, which are irrelevant to an examination of
whether a legislature acted with a racist purpose,180 would be incor-
porated into the Court’s Equal Protection analysis in later cases.181
The effect of these decisions has been to dilute the anti-racism
protections of the Equal Protection Clause.  It is extremely difficult
to prove an impermissible purpose in the absence of a racial classifi-
cation triggering strict scrutiny because the burden is on the chal-
lenger to prove that some racist purpose was a factor.182  Proving
that a racist purpose was a factor is difficult without an obvious pat-
tern of explicit racism.183  When an affirmative action program is
implemented, strict scrutiny applies, and not many laws survive
such scrutiny.184  It is incredibly ironic that a facially neutral law
may be passed or enforced without regard for its impact upon mi-
norities because of a court’s deference to legislative discretion, yet
where the legislative discretion is to correct past racial discrimina-
tion, the impact upon the majority is of constitutional signifi-
cance.185  This method of enforcement has turned the anti-racism
principle on its head.  It enables conservatives to attack affirmative
action on Equal Protection grounds with the presumptive unconsti-
tutionality of any racial classification.  But this logic also allows the
179. Id. at 298-99. But see id. at 324 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) (arguing for a lower standard of review in light of remedial nature of affirma-
tive action).
180. See Chang, supra note 167.
181. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
182. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
183. See id. at 266; Davis, 426 U.S. 229.  While the disparate impact in these cases
are not enough, the “stark impact” in cases such as Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356, and Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), were enough to trigger strict scrutiny.  A question
remains as to what is precisely the level of impact to implicate “stark impact.”  Contrast-
ing the factual scenarios in Arlington Heights and Davis with Yick Wo and Gomillion, how-
ever, the level of impact must be considerable, probably approaching a level of
complete disparity in enforcement.
184. For example, at the Supreme Court level, affirmative action laws were struck
down in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S.
469; Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986); and Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
185. See Chang, supra note 167.  For an example of an article focused on the disad-
vantage to whites, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Ac-
tion and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289 (2001).
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passage or enforcement (with an impermissible intent) of facially
neutral laws with disproportionate impacts, where courts are loath
to inquire as to whether there was a racist motivation.186  This irony
is most evident in measures to end affirmative action.
B. Ending Affirmative Action in California: Coalition for
Economic Equity v. Wilson187
After the passage of Proposition 209, the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (“ACLU”) and others filed suit to enjoin enforcement of
the new law.188  The district court noted that the challenge to the
law was not a facial challenge to the entire proposition, rather it was
a challenge to the portion of the initiative which would prohibit
voluntary affirmative action programs.189  This was because some of
the discrimination banned by Proposition 209 was already forbid-
den under the Constitution.190  The district court held that Proposi-
tion 209 was clearly intended to “close the narrow but significant
window” that allows affirmative action programs that pass the mea-
sure of strict scrutiny.191  The ACLU alleged that this violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Supremacy Clause.192  After finding that the plaintiffs had stand-
ing,193 Judge Henderson made extensive findings of fact, including
that Proposition 209 was intended to end affirmative action pro-
grams,194 and that it would negatively affect minority gains in public
186. See Chang, supra note 167.  But in Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47
DUKE L.J. 187 (1997), Prof. Spann notes that this unequal treatment may be the result
of courts violating the Equal Protection Clause.  How a disadvantaged party might chal-
lenge this manner of violation is unclear, although the idea is interesting.
187. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
188. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
189. Id. at 1489.
190. Id. at 1488-89.
191. Id. at 1489.
192. Id. at 1489-90.  This Note will only address the analysis of the Equal Protection
issue in both the district court and the Ninth Circuit.
193. Id. at 1491-92.  The District Court found that the plaintiffs met the three ele-
ments of standing in a federal case. Id.  The plaintiffs showed a real and immediate
injury in the loss of benefits from affirmative action. Id.  The injury was caused by the
challenged conduct, because the Governor would have to enforce Proposition 209. Id.
at 1492.  Finally, a declaration of unconstitutionality of Proposition 209 would redress
the plaintiff’s injury. Id.
194. Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1493-95.
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contracting,195 employment,196 education,197 and the political
process.198
After declaring the findings of fact, the district court analyzed
the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on their Equal Protection claims
before granting a preliminary injunction.199  Judge Henderson ex-
amined the case in light of Hunter v. Erickson200 and Washington v.
Seattle School District No. 1.201  These cases, stating Equal Protection
“political structure” principles, prohibit the reallocation of political
power in a discriminatory manner in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.202  After finding the “Seattle-Hunter” doctrine applica-
ble,203 the district court found that Proposition 209 had a racial
focus,204 and that it restructured the political process to the detri-
ment of minorities because Proposition 209 required minorities to
go through a state constitutional referendum to institute a remedial
affirmative action program, where other groups would be able to
institute such a program locally.205  Because the state could assert
no important governmental interest in the law, it likely violated the
195. Id. at 1495-96 (quoting minority business owners discussing the lack of oppor-
tunity before affirmative action because of discrimination).  The district court noted
that in Los Angeles, affirmative action increased the percentage of city contracts
awarded to women (from 0.3% to 8%) and minorities (from 2% to 11.8%). Id. at 1496.
196. Id. at 1496-97.
197. Id. at 1497-98 (finding that the admissions of some minority students could be
reduced by up to 50%).
198. Id. at 1498-99.  The district court found that Proposition 209 would prohibit
minorities from seeking a remedial program at the local level. Id. at 1498.  Instead,
they would have to amend the California constitution to permit affirmative action, then
seek a local program.  Id.
199. Id. at 1499.  In the district court’s words: “[T]o obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion, the moving party must demonstrate either (1) a combination of probable success
on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are
raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the movant.” Id. at 1492
(citations omitted) (describing the preliminary injunction standard).
200. 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (challenge to an ordinance requiring fair housing ordi-
nances to pass not only the City Council, but citywide voting).
201. 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (challenge to initiative prohibiting busing of students to
achieve integration).
202. See Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1500-01.
203. Id. at 1499-1504.  The district court noted that the differing levels of scrutiny
due to racial and gender classifications did not affect whether the political structure
doctrine was applicable to gender classifications. Id. at 1501.
204. Id. at 1504-06.
205. Id. at 1506-08.
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Equal Protection Clause.206  In conclusion, the district court noted
that Proposition 209 “is tantamount to vote dilution in the most
literal sense: the relevant voting pool is effectively expanded until
the prior victory [in implementing the program] is undone.”207
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held differently
on appeal.208  The Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between “con-
ventional” Equal Protection analysis and “political structure” Equal
Protection analysis, the former being concerned with the substance
of the law and the latter being concerned with the level at which
the law is enacted.209  The main contention of Judge O’Scannlain
in the Ninth Circuit opinion was that Proposition 209 does not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause in either a “conventional” analy-
sis210 or a “political structure” analysis.211
In his opinion, Judge O’Scannlain applied “conventional”
Equal Protection analysis based on the premise that the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment is to prevent “official conduct discrimi-
nating on the basis of race.“212  The court of appeals noted the dif-
ferences between laws with a racial classification and facially neutral
laws, and upon noting that Proposition 209 was facially neutral,
held that “as a matter of law and logic, [Proposition 209] does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause in any conventional sense.”213
The Ninth Circuit then considered Proposition 209 under the
“political structure” analysis of Hunter and Seattle School.214  After
summarizing the district court’s opinion regarding Hunter and Seat-
tle School,215 Judge O’Scannlain examined whether a majority of the
electorate could restructure the political process against itself, ulti-
mately deferring any decision on that issue because of the lack of
206. Id. at 1508-09.
207. Id. at 1510.
208. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 701-10.  The Ninth Circuit heard arguments in the
case on application for a stay of the district court’s decision. Id. at 698-99.  The Ninth
Circuit, instead of issuing or denying the stay and sending the case back to district court
for trial, expedited its decision on the merits. Id. at 699.
209. Id. at 701.
210. Id. at 701-02.
211. Id. at 702-10.
212. Id. at 701, quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
213. Id. at 702.
214. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 702-709.
215. Id. at 703-04.
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specific findings in the district court opinion.216  Next, the Ninth
Circuit examined whether “a burden on achieving race-based or
gender-based preferential treatment can deny individuals equal
protection of the laws.”217  Judge O’Scannlain’s examination began
with an attempt to distinguish Proposition 209 from the statutes
challenged in Hunter and Seattle School because the proposition pro-
hibited all racial and gender preferences by the state; it did not
merely withhold discretion in certain areas.218  Secondly, the Ninth
Circuit analyzed the question of whether “an individual’s right to
equal treatment” was implicated by the law.219  On that question,
the Ninth Circuit found that because the right to seek preferential
treatment was different from the right to seek equal treatment, and
there was no protection of the right to seek preferential treatment,
the district court was wrong in finding that the plaintiffs displayed a
likelihood of success in their claim that the Equal Protection Clause
was violated by Proposition 209.220
While both the district court and the Ninth Circuit noted that
Proposition 209 was facially neutral, only the district court correctly
analyzed the problem under a “conventional” Equal Protection
analysis.221  Judge Henderson was correct in stating that the effect
of Proposition 209, like those laws in Hunter and Seattle School, sup-
plied the “classification” necessary to subject the law to greater scru-
tiny, and his subsequent analysis in finding a lack of a compelling
purpose for Proposition 209 is solid.222  But the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis is inadequately supported.  Judge O’Scannlain, while cor-
rectly identifying the adjudicative rules involved with racial classifi-
cations and facially neutral laws,223 completely misstates the values
underlying the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Ninth Circuit cites
216. Id. at 704-05.  Judge O’Scannlain commented in a footnote that if there had
been evidence in the district court that women were a majority of the electorate, he
would have likely concluded that Proposition 209’s prohibitions on gender preferences
would be valid. Id. at 705 n.13.
217. Id. at 705.
218. Id. at 705-707.
219. Id. at 707.
220. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 707-09.  The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district
court’s findings with respect to the Supremacy Clause claims. Id. at 709-11.
221. See Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1499-1504.
222. See id. at 1503-1504.
223. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 702.
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Palmore v. Sidoti224 for the premise that the “ultimate goal of the
Equal Protection Clause is ‘to do away with all governmentally im-
posed discrimination based on race.’”225  This statement of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose is incorrect for two reasons.
First, Palmore cites Strauder v. West Virginia for its understanding of
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment,226 and Palmore’s char-
acterization of Strauder is inaccurate because Strauder was con-
cerned with purpose.227  Secondly, this ignores that the Equal
Protection Clause has always allowed governmental discriminations,
as evidenced in cases like Plessy v. Ferguson228 and segregation laws
which were constitutionally permissible until cases like Brown v.
Board of Education229 and Loving v. Virginia.230  This also ignores
how the clause’s purpose was enforced in Arlington Heights,231 and
cases like Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,232 and later in
Grutter v. Bollinger.233  In those cases, it was the possibility of an im-
permissible purpose rooted in animus or stereotype that the Court
was guarding against.  If some discrimination can be constitu-
tional,234 then the ultimate goal of the Equal Protection Clause can-
not be to end all discrimination.  Rather, the goal of a
“conventional” Equal Protection analysis must be to find and end
discrimination based on impermissible purposes.235
224. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
225. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 701 (citation omitted).
226. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879)).
227. See discussion supra note 51. Strauder mentions “unfriendly” discriminations,
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306, and could not have meant all discrimination because segrega-
tion and anti-miscegenation laws were still legal. See also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (noting that examinations of the purposes of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment are ultimately inconclusive).
228. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
229. 347 U.S. 483.
230. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
231. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
232. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
233. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
234. See Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2004) (O’Scannlain, J.) (up-
holding segregation of prisoners by race in California prisons), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 1141
(2005).
235. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that animus is not even
rationally related to a legitimate state interest); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (Equal
Protection Clause protects against legislation passed with animus); Korematsu v. United
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If the facial neutrality of the law is not dispositive in determin-
ing whether an Equal Protection violation has occurred, but rather
whether the state’s purpose in enacting the law was permissible,
then Judge O’Scannlain’s reliance on Proposition 209’s ostensible
neutrality to find that there was no Equal Protection violation is
misguided.  This is particularly true considering the district court’s
findings that Proposition 209 had a racial focus because it was pur-
posefully targeted at ending programs that were beneficial to mi-
norities and women.236  This focus may have triggered suspicion
under Arlington Heights.237  Despite the district court’s finding of ra-
cial focus, Judge O’Scannlain assumed, without questioning, the
permissibility of the voters’ purposes in enacting the law.  Properly
applied judicial scrutiny, however, would have found that the values
underlying the Fourteenth Amendment necessitated, at the very
least, a closer consideration of the issues in this case.238  The Ninth
Circuit’s consideration of the “political structure” doctrine is simi-
larly faulty.
The Ninth Circuit’s application of the “political structure” doc-
trine is hampered by its incomplete analysis of the Hunter239 and
Seattle School240 cases.  The Supreme Court in Hunter examined a
law prohibiting the city council from remedying racial discrimina-
tion in public housing without majority electorate approval.241  Jus-
tice White, delivering the opinion of the court, stated that the law
requiring citywide approval “places special burdens on racial minor-
ities within the governmental process. This is no more permissible
than denying them the vote, on an equal basis with others.”242  In
Seattle School, the Supreme Court examined a state ban on school
busing with broad exceptions, except as to race, which effectively
barred desegregation.243  Justice Blackmun, writing the majority
opinion, said:
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (levels of scrutiny are intended to guard against state actions
rooted in animus or stereotype).
236. See Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1493-1507.
237. 429 U.S. at 265-66. See also discussion infra Section IV-A.
238. See discussion infra Section IV.
239. 393 U.S. 385.
240. 458 U.S. 457.
241. Hunter, 393 U.S. 385.
242. Id. at 391.
243. Seattle School, 458 U.S. 457.
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[W]hen the political process or the decisionmaking
mechanism used to address racially conscious legislation
— and only such legislation — is singled out for peculiar
and disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action
plainly “rests on ‘distinctions based on race.’”  And when
the State’s allocation of power places unusual burdens on
the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically
designed to overcome the “special condition” of
prejudice, the governmental action seriously “[curtails]
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities.”244
The Ninth Circuit read these cases as stating the principle that the
state may not disadvantage minorities by placing more obstacles to
enacting legislation in their paths than those of any other group, in
particular by requiring them to enact legislation at higher levels of
government than other groups.245  In applying this principle, how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit, accepting the district court’s finding that
minorities were burdened as to seeking legislation, held minorities
were not unconstitutionally burdened because a) Proposition 209
did not “reallocate political authority in a discriminatory man-
ner,”246 and b) Proposition 209 did not burden an individual’s right
to equal treatment.247
Firstly, in its examination of the Hunter and Seattle School doc-
trines, the Ninth Circuit ignored why the political structure doc-
trine exists.  The doctrine exists to root out facially neutral laws,
passed with invidious purposes, that impose political burdens on
minorities.248  The highly suspect and formalistic parsing in which
the Ninth Circuit engaged does not reflect the language of either
Hunter or Seattle School and is not the “sensitive inquiry” that is
244. Id. at 485-86 (citations omitted).  In a footnote, Justice Blackmun notes that it
is not the mere repeal of a desegregation plan that is impermissible, it is “the State’s
race-conscious restructuring of its decisionmaking process that is impermissible.” Id. at
485 n.29.  In a separate footnote, he states, “singling out the political processes affecting
racial issues for uniquely disadvantageous treatment inevitably raises dangers of imper-
missible motivation.” Id. at 486 n.30.
245. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 703.
246. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 706-07.
247. Id. at 707-08.
248. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392-93 (discussing the legislature’s justifications for law,
which indicates a concern with purpose, not merely effect of restructuring); Seattle
School, 458 U.S. at 486 n.30 (explicitly discussing purpose).
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called for in Arlington Heights.249  Even a case that the Ninth Circuit
quoted to distinguish Proposition 209 from the laws at issue in
Hunter and Seattle School indicates that the purpose in enacting a law
is paramount.  The Ninth Circuit quoted from Crawford v. Board of
Education250 that “the simple repeal or modification of desegrega-
tion or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed
as embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.”251  This
“more” is evidence of an impermissible purpose.  The Ninth Circuit
failed to examine whether “more” is present, although the district
court had already found that the law was racially focused,252 and the
Ninth Circuit accepted the district court’s finding that the law
would burden minorities seeking affirmative action programs.253
Hunter and Seattle School are cases where political restructuring was
evidence of impermissible purposes, a fact the Ninth Circuit ig-
nored when analyzing those cases.
The Ninth Circuit contradicted itself in determining whether
Proposition 209 discriminated on the basis of race or addressed ra-
cial matters neutrally.  The Ninth Circuit accepted the finding of
the district court that Proposition 209 burdened minorities over
other groups in seeking affirmative action programs.254  This is be-
cause minorities under Proposition 209 will have to pass an amend-
ment to the California constitution in order to enact an affirmative
action program, while other groups seeking preferences will not.
Under Hunter and Seattle School this was enough to trigger strict
scrutiny255 because, by requiring minorities to act at the state level,
their vote had been diluted.256  In distinguishing Proposition 209
from Seattle School, however, Judge O’Scannlain pointed out that
the Supreme Court in Seattle School noted that Washington State
could have removed all discretion from the localities in enacting
school legislation, instead of only that discretion relating to racial
249. 429 U.S. at 266.
250. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
251. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539, quoted in Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 705-06 (emphasis
added).
252. Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1504-06.  Judge O’Scannlain never addressed this
finding by the district court.
253. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 705.
254. Id.
255. Seattle School, 458 U.S. at 485-86.
256. Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1510.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 37 29-APR-05 9:37
2005] JUDICIAL BIAS IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 1209
busing.257  Also, Washington State had allowed localities to deal
with racial matters in general and not reserved to itself the sole
right to do so.258  The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that Califor-
nia merely withheld from localities all discretion to act on racial
matters, which is distinguishable from the selective withholding in
Seattle School that triggered strict scrutiny.259  The Ninth Circuit’s
holding in this part is that, though Proposition 209 burdens minori-
ties, it does not do so impermissibly because it burdens minorities
consistently with respect to all areas of the law and, as such, is not a
racial classification.  Yet, Proposition 209 does not withhold all ra-
cial policy making.  It only withholds those policies relating to pref-
erences in education, employment, and contracting, leaving
preferences or discriminations in other areas to the discretion of
the localities.260  If, as Judge O’Scannlain allowed, minorities as a
class are burdened (which seems to be a classification), how does a
general burden make the classification any less suspect?  By formal-
istically separating the “political structure” doctrine from its pur-
poses, the Ninth Circuit undercut the whole exercise of judicial
scrutiny.
Secondly, the Ninth Circuit held that a law that restructures
the political process can only violate the constitution if it denies
equal treatment.261  It then ostensibly distinguished Proposition
209 from the laws in Hunter, Seattle School, and Romer v. Evans262
because the laws at issue in those cases prevented “equal treat-
ment.”263  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the “political structure”
257. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 707.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.  Conceivably, a locality could pass a law giving prefer-
ences to a racial or sexual group in welfare laws, the provision of counsel, jail accommo-
dations, subsidized housing, etc., so long as these laws met the same strict scrutiny other
affirmative action laws are required to withstand.  The state could also pass a law requir-
ing segregation in prisons. See Johnson, 321 F.3d 791 (O’Scannlain, J.) (upholding seg-
regation of prisoners by race in California prisons).
261. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 707-08.
262. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
263. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 708-09.  The Ninth Circuit’s logic ignored that many
conservatives considered the challenged amendment in Romer as proscribing “special
treatment” for homosexuals. Romer, 517 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
amendment prohibits special treatment of homosexuals, and nothing more.”).  The con-
stitutional burden on homosexuals seeking anti-discrimination laws is irrelevant to
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doctrine does not protect structuring against affirmative action pro-
grams because, first, these programs seek preferential treatment
and are subject to strict scrutiny, and second, a state can ban them
all together.264  This reasoning is flawed.  It assumed that the consti-
tutional burden of the benefit sought by minorities mattered in the
examination of a law burdening their ability to seek the preference.
The Equal Protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, how-
ever, is not concerned with the programs minority voters seek, it is
concerned with their ability to seek them; the constitutional bur-
dens they face have nothing to do with diluting their ability to vote.
For example, in order to institute a school busing program, such as
that in Seattle School, a state may have to survive strict scrutiny.  But
that factor did not affect the decision in Seattle School and should
not have affected the analysis with respect to the constitutionality of
Proposition 209.  The Ninth Circuit opinion ignored that an affirm-
ative action program based on race could be implemented constitu-
tionally.265  The fact it must undergo strict scrutiny does not negate
the right of a minority to institute a constitutional program at the
same political level as any other group, despite Judge O’Scannlain’s
barely masked hostility to the plaintiff’s claims.266
The Ninth Circuit opinion is flawed in other ways.  In a discus-
sion regarding whether a majority of the electorate can discrimi-
nate against itself, Judge O’Scannlain accepted a dubious premise
and contorted it to reach the desired result.  Judge O’Scannlain
stated that it “make[s] little sense to apply ‘political structure’ equal
protection principles where the group . . . constitutes a majority of
the electorate.”267  He went on to state in a footnote that to hold
that a majority could impose a political structure upon itself in vio-
whether the state’s law is permissible. Id. at 633 (Kennedy, J.) (“Central both to the
idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is
the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to
all who seek its assistance.”).
264. Id. at 708-10.
265. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Coral Constr. Co. v. King
County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991) (O’Scannlain, J.) (examining constitutionality of
King County’s affirmative action program).
266. See Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d 692.
267. Id. at 705.  Women and majorities together, and women alone, constitute a
majority of the California electorate.
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lation of Equal Protection would be “inimical” to democracy.268
This ignored four major considerations.  First, a majority of voters
can violate a constitutional provision.  Arguably, this happens when-
ever an unconstitutional law is passed.  Second, Judge
O’Scannlain’s contention is premised on an assumption that
women and minorities as groups equally value the ability to institute
remedial preference programs.  Judge O’Scannlain wrongly
lumped together the differing equal protection interests of women
and minorities in affirmative action programs.  Minorities over-
whelmingly opposed Proposition 209 while women were almost
evenly split.269  Third, the facts in the case were directly contrary to
the court’s premise.  Women, the majority of the electorate, were
narrowly opposed to the measure, yet it still passed.270  Finally,
Judge O’Scannlain’s discussion lacked any probative value as to the
Equal Protection questions.  He missed the entire point of judicial
inquiry in assuming that a majority could not discriminate against
itself in repealing affirmative action.271  If that logic were used in
examining legislative purpose in implementing an affirmative ac-
tion program, almost all affirmative action programs would be per-
missible because it is the majority instituting a program to its
detriment.272  Nevertheless, this was an “eminently sensible conclu-
sion” to the Ninth Circuit.273
Finally, the Ninth Circuit failed to heed its own advice, losing
“sight of the forest for the trees” in its examination of Equal Protec-
tion and strict scrutiny.274  Judge O’Scannlain quoted City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co.275 for the proposition that classifications
rooted in “notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics” are
268. Id. at 705 n.13.
269. Election ’96: State Propositions: A Snapshot of Voters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at
A29.  This could be interpreted to imply that minorities placed a greater value on af-
firmative action than did women.
270. Id.  Women voted against the measure 52% to 48%.
271. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 704.
272. But see, e.g., Coral Constr., 941 F.2d 910 (striking down affirmative action pro-
gram).  A majority of an electorate could also act with “self-hate” or stereotype in pass-
ing a law, acting with animus or stereotype towards itself, in violation of Equal
Protection.
273. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 704.
274. Id. at 709.
275. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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the targets of strict scrutiny.276  While focused on the trees of
whether an individual has a right to seek a constitutional prefer-
ence, the court of appeals ignored that Proposition 209 was passed
in a jungle of racial politics,277 the seeds of which were probably
rooted in California’s long history of racism and racist politics.278
Judge O’Scannlain ignored the fact that Proposition 209 only bur-
dens the beneficiaries of affirmative action, who all happen to fall
into two suspect classes — women and minorities.  The Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that the “Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the
mere repeal of race-related legislation . . . that [was] not required
. . . in the first place.”279  This both ignored that this is not a “mere
repeal” but rather a flat prohibition on future legislation,280 and
that the purposes underlying the prohibition probably would not
have survived properly applied strict scrutiny enforcing the anti-ra-
cism principle.
Why this issue was not raised or examined closely is certainly
debatable.  It may have been raised and discounted, although this is
unlikely considering the complete absence of the argument from
the court opinions.  The ACLU may not have made the argument
based on a feeling that a court would not likely examine the motiva-
tions of an entire electorate.281  They may not have made the argu-
ment to avoid implications of implying the citizens of California
were racist or from an uncertainty of how far a court would go in
gleaning evidence of impermissible intent from the facts.
The Ninth Circuit opinion reveals how judicial bias, at best,
and animosity, at worst, undermines the protections of the Equal
Protection Clause.282  The Ninth Circuit, even while paying lip ser-
276. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 708 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
277. See discussion supra Part II-B-ii.
278. TOMA´S ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE
SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (Univ. of Cal. Press 1994).
279. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 706 (quoting Crawford, 458 U.S. 527, 538).
280. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.  Unlike the situation in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217 (1971), where both whites and blacks were burdened by the closing of city pools to
avoid desegregation, this “mere repeal” only harms minorities and women.
281. But see Jodi Miller, Affirmative Action: “Democracy in Free Fall”: The Use of Ballot
Initiatives to Dismantle Stat-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1,
9 (1999), for a discussion of voter referenda.
282. While the tone and reasoning of Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion in this case re-
flects outright hostility to the plaintiffs’ claims, his other opinions dealing with similar
issues in Coral Construction, 941 F.2d 910, and Johnson, 321 F.3d 791, are far more fair in
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vice to the district court’s findings,283 turned a blind eye towards
what most people, and certainly most minorities, know from experi-
ence — that race permeates everything.284  Sadly, the Ninth Circuit
has a modicum of support in muddled Supreme Court doctrine.285
Unfortunately, the judges that should protect minorities too often
let political considerations infect their analysis,286 bandage their
suspect reasoning with confused doctrinal phrasing,287 and pretend
as if racism no longer affects the direction of law or politics.288  The
opposing perspectives of judicial notice and judicial blindness are
sharply illustrated by the varying outlooks of the two African-Ameri-
can Supreme Court justices.
C. Upholding Affirmative Action: Justice Marshall vs. Justice
Thomas
The diverging methods the Supreme Court can employ in ex-
amining race are illustrated by the philosophies of Thurgood Mar-
shall and Clarence Thomas, the two African-Americans to have
served on the Court.  Thurgood Marshall was appointed in 1967 by
tone and reasoning.  The inconsistency between these cases and Economic Equity, 122
F.3d 692, along with the suspect reasoning employed in deciding Economic Equity, raises
questions.
283. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 705 (accepting district court’s determination that Pro-
position 209 burdens minorities).
284. See, e.g., CORNELL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993). See also, HARPER LEE, TO KILL A
MOCKINGBIRD (Warner Books 1982) (1960) (describing a young girl’s experience in
1930s Alabama); WALTER MOSLEY, ALWAYS OUTNUMBERED, ALWAYS OUTGUNNED (Pocket
Books 1998) (describing episodically the stories of a black man in 1990s Los Angeles);
JOHN LEGUIZAMO, FREAK: A SEMI-DEMI-QUASI-PSEUDO AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Riverhead 1997)
(one man play about growing up Latino in New York City); CHANG-RAE LEE, NATIVE
SPEAKER (Riverhead Books 1996) (describing identity crisis of an Asian American);
CHRIS ROCK: BRING THE PAIN (HBO 1996) (comedy routine about many racial issues).
285. See the discussion and use of Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, and Palmore, 466 U.S.
429, in Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion, as well as the quotations he uses from various
other cases.
286. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; see also David
Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism
or Conservative Justices, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (1991); David Margolick et al., The Path to
Florida, VANITY FAIR, October 2004, at 310 (discussing how conservative members of the
Court decided the 2000 election).
287. See Chang, supra note 286.
288. See discussion supra Section II.
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President Johnson and served until retiring in 1991.289  Clarence
Thomas was appointed by President George H.W. Bush to replace
Marshall and took his seat in 1991.290  Justice Marshall was the leg-
endary litigator who argued Brown v. Board of Education on behalf of
the NAACP.291  Justice Thomas served as Chairman of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission under President Reagan.292
Each was on a different side of the political spectrum and, as their
dissents in two very important affirmative action cases show, on op-
posite sides of how the reality of race should affect Equal Protection
jurisprudence.
Dissenting from the decision in Bakke, Justice Marshall wrote of
the history of discrimination against blacks, and then stated: “The
position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but inevitable
consequence of centuries of unequal treatment.  Measured by any
benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful equality re-
mains a distant dream for the Negro.”293  He went on to take notice
of the societal problems and issues confronting African Americans
— including shorter life expectancy, higher infant mortality rates,
greater poverty rates, higher unemployment rates294 — some of
which remain today, twenty-five years later.295  He further wrote: “In
light of the . . . history of discrimination and its devastating impact
on the lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of
American life should be a state interest of the highest order.  To fail
to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided
society.”296  Marshall argued that remedial uses of affirmative action
are necessary because of, and justified by, the decades of state
oppression.297
289. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, available at http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
290. The Justices of the Supreme Court, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/bi-
ographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
291. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
292. The Justices of the Supreme Court, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/bi-
ographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
293. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 395 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
294. Id. at 395.
295. See supra discussion Part II.
296. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395.
297. Id. at 400-02.  Of course, educational diversity is also a permissible goal, which
is not necessarily related to remedial affirmative action.
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Justice Thomas, dissenting from Grutter v. Bollinger twenty-five
years later,298 took a different approach.  His dissent began with a
quote from Frederick Douglass about letting African-Americans be
independent from the interference of whites, even if well inten-
tioned.299  Thomas asserted his belief that “blacks can achieve in
every avenue of American life without the meddling of university
administrators.”300  Thomas then attacked the majority reasoning in
light of his strict interpretation of the Constitution, largely arguing
that educational diversity is not a compelling state interest.301
While Justice Thomas gave glancing reference in a footnote to the
condition of blacks in society, he dismissed educational affirmative
action as irrelevant to the problem.302
Has so much changed between Bakke in 1978 and Grutter in
2003 to justify such different dissents from these two justices?  Re-
cent history would not seem to reflect such a radical change in the
need for remedial or educational affirmative action.303  Each justice
anchored his opinion on the strong points of his argument — Mar-
shall, that history demands allowance of remedial action, and
Thomas, that the Constitution does not allow action that discrimi-
nates.  Thomas, however, is on the weaker ground, both doctrinally
and morally.  First, the large sum of Supreme Court precedent and
original intent allow interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause
which permit affirmative action programs.304  Thomas can argue
for a strict construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the text
of the Constitution is not the only reference point for constitu-
298. 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
299. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349.
300. Id.
301. Id.  This is interesting, because when Justice Thomas was born in Georgia in
1948, segregation was still legal.  Educational diversity is so compelling that segregation
of schools is “inherently unequal,” Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.  Educational diversity was
compelling enough that presidents mobilized troops to enforce desegregation.
302. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354 n.3.  But see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BIG PAYOFF:
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHETIC ESTIMATES OF WORK-LIFE EARNINGS 2 (2002),
and NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ANNUAL EARNINGS OF YOUNG ADULTS, BY EDUCA-
TIONAL ATTAINMENT (1999), for statistics showing the correlation between the level of
education attained and income.
303. See discussion supra Part II-A-ii.
304. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.  Other cases, while striking down
laws, have never prohibited affirmative action per se.
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tional principles.305  Second, Thomas ignored the history of racism
that makes affirmative action necessary and thereby lacked the
sense of justice that Marshall possessed in his dissent.  By ignoring
the history and present state of race in America, and instead hewing
closely to the original text, Thomas would enforce the injustices
bred by the old understandings of that text — understandings that
allowed segregation, anti-miscegenation laws, poll taxes — a mor-
ally suspect interpretive choice.306
As seen from the difference between Justice Marshall’s and Jus-
tice Thomas’s philosophy, a judge can acknowledge the history of
racism and its present effects on the state of minorities, or he can
ignore them or relegate them to a footnote.  Unfortunately, if the
highest ranking (and only) minority member of the nation’s high-
est court is arguing that affirmative action is irrelevant to the social
ills affecting minorities, what are lower courts, legislators, and the
public to think?  Perhaps they will think that the interests of “inno-
cent whites,” which receive consideration (and not in a footnote),
are more important than the interests of minorities, mentioned ei-
ther in dissent or in footnotes?
Disappointingly, there has not been an even application of the
anti-racism principle.  From district courts to courts of appeals to
the Supreme Court, judicial decision makers usually fail to see the
core issues in cases involving race or hide behind doctrines which
do not necessarily enforce the principles underlying the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.  While some commentators argue that this is a rea-
son for courts to not involve themselves in disputes regarding
affirmative action,307 others argue for a more consistent application
of legal principles.308  Because it is a duty of the courts to enforce
constitutional principles, judicial intervention is not only war-
ranted, but mandatory where violations of Equal Protection occur.
The consistent application of previously formulated legal principles
in those circumstances, however, will not be enough to stop viola-
305. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (using social studies to find that segregation was
inherently unequal).
306. It was this interpretation that supported Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
307. See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187 (1997) (arguing that
affirmative action is a political question).
308. David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judi-
cial Conservatism or Conservative Justices, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (1991).
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tions of the anti-racism principle, particularly where the perpetra-
tors are savvy enough to avoid displays of gross racism.  The
solution is for courts to apply strict scrutiny, with an understanding
of how racism is currently displayed, when a state acts to end an
affirmative action program.  This scrutiny should require the state
to rebut a presumption of impermissible purposes by making a rea-
sonable finding of fact that the program in question has succeeded
or failed and should be discontinued or modified.
IV. A NEW ANALYSIS FOR CHALLENGES TO MEASURES ENDING
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
If the Court takes seriously the anti-racism principle first articu-
lated in Strauder v. West Virginia309 and Yick Wo v. Hopkins,310 then it
must apply greater scrutiny to measures undertaken to end affirma-
tive action.  The concerns underlying the need for close judicial
scrutiny stated in Korematsu v. United States311 are also present when
a state acts to end affirmative action.  A close examination, such as
that called for in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,312 of the issues surrounding anti-affirmative ac-
tion efforts often will reveal an underlying purpose rooted in racial
animosity and stereotypes.  If the judicial analysis of the permissibil-
ity of implementing an affirmative action policy can recognize the
complicated and shifting nature of the racial issues involved,313
there is no reason that a similar examination cannot be made of
efforts to end affirmative action.  Where a white majority acts to end
affirmative action programs, a court should exercise strict scrutiny
with a better understanding of how racism is manifested in the
world today.  This scrutiny will enable courts to protect against the
new hidden racism and ensure that affirmative action programs are
ended at appropriate times and for permissible purposes.
309. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
310. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
311. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
312. 429 U.S. 252 (1976).
313. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Adarand Constr., Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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A. The Justification for Strict Scrutiny
When a state passes a law with a racial classification, that law is
presumptively in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.314  This
may reflect the increased probability that a law with a racial classifi-
cation was passed with a purpose rooted in racism or stereotype.315
There is also a normative proposition that racial classifications are
intrinsically wrong despite their purpose.316  The state bears the
burden of rebutting the presumption of unconstitutionality by
showing the racial classification “is precisely tailored to serve a com-
pelling governmental interest.”317
A facially neutral law that is enforced discriminatorily is also
subject to strict scrutiny.318  One indicator of discriminatory en-
forcement is disproportionate impact.319  Although a law may have
a disproportionate impact, disparate impact alone is not enough to
subject it to strict scrutiny.320  Because legislators must balance nu-
merous concerns when drafting a piece of legislation, courts give
314. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
315. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 109.  This is a product of both the histori-
cal record of laws with racial classifications reflecting impermissible purposes, as well as
that the probability is quite low that the legislature may have legitimate purposes when
differentiating between races.
316. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (stating: “I believe that there is a moral . . . equivalence between laws designed to
subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race. . . . Government
cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the
law.” Internal quotes and cites omitted).  Justice Thomas is wrong.  There is an enor-
mous moral difference between laws designed to treat minorities as sub-human, such as
anti-miscegenation laws and other Jim Crow laws, and laws designed to remedy the
effects of oppression or encourage diversity in education.  It is baffling how this is not
apparent, particularly to someone who was born in Georgia when segregation was still
legal and also benefited from affirmative action.  Furthermore, as history demonstrates,
affirmative action can have positive effects upon the state of minorities, and legal doc-
trines can shape social mores, thus increasing social equality. See discussion in text,
supra notes 125-32.
317. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978).
318. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; see also Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356; Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
319. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; see also Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356; Gomillion, 364
U.S. 339.
320. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976).
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great deference to legislative decisions.321  Nevertheless, where
“there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating
factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justi-
fied.”322  If a state acts with purpose rooted in animus, then the
action is invalid.323
There are many ways a state could act to end affirmative action.
The action could take the form of a specific repeal, a general ban
applicable to current and future programs,324 a regulatory
change,325 or a court order.  If a prospective ban is passed, and
there are no existing programs, or those programs are exempted
from the ban, other issues are raised.326  Regardless of the method,
321. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
322. Id. at 265-66 (citing Brest, supra note 315, at 116-18).
323. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding Colorado amendment in-
valid because purposes rooted in animus bore no rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
324. Although it may seem odd to sue to stop the “enforcement” of a repeal, there
is precedent. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (Colorado amendment would have repealed mu-
nicipal anti-discrimination laws); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp.
1480, 1491-92 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
325. A regulatory change could include federal or state agency changes in affirma-
tive action program requirements, criteria, or agency policy that harm beneficiaries of
affirmative action.  It could also include changes in criteria governing admissions to
colleges, the administration of minority scholarships, or funding of student
organizations.
326. There are two main issues involved in prospective bans where no affirmative
program is currently in place or affected.  First, assuming a state with no affirmative
action programs prospectively bans future programs, a potential plaintiff’s standing is
highly suspect.  The plaintiff would have to allege that she would have benefited from a
program that would have been enacted if there was no ban.  This is not the concrete
and particularized injury required by the standing doctrine. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  There might remain, however, other possible inju-
ries such as a political structure disadvantage resulting in a cause of action under the
Seattle-Hunter doctrine.  See discussion in text, supra notes 214-20, 239-66, for an over-
view of the Seattle-Hunter doctrine.  If such an injury were alleged, the plaintiff would
have standing to allege further violations under a “conventional” Equal Protection anal-
ysis, see discussion in text, supra notes 221-38, in effect piggybacking on the political
structure injury.
Second, if standing were resolved, any formulation or use of the proposed test
results in an impossible burden for the state to overcome to enact a prospective ban.  It
is impossible to prospectively show with detail that affirmative action programs that do
not yet exist would be ineffective or unnecessary.  Application of the test to such situa-
tions would result in all prospective bans on affirmative action being ruled unconstitu-
tional.  This would effectively create a per se rule.  While there are policy arguments to
be made for such a rule, that result should not occur because of a formalistic applica-
tion of the proposed test.  It is imaginable that a state with no affirmative action pro-
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when a state acts to end affirmative action, its efforts should be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny for numerous reasons.327
First, the purpose inquiries relevant to the imposition of an
affirmative action program are just as relevant, if not more, to mea-
sures ending those programs.  If a majority effort to implement a
minority preference program (to the majority’s detriment) may be
impermissibly rooted in either racial animus or stereotype, it is
more likely that a majority working to end such a program (to the
minority’s detriment) is acting with forbidden purposes.  This is
particularly likely to be true where the majority knows that the mi-
norities will face a detrimental impact.  If an inquiry into purpose is
warranted in the first instance, it is certainly warranted in the sec-
ond.  Indeed, if a state passed an affirmative action program to rem-
edy the effects of past discrimination it may be just as likely that the
previous underlying racism is present as a motivation in ending the
program, particularly in a voter referendum.
Secondly, although the language of voter initiatives like Pro-
position 209 or the repeal of an antidiscrimination law do not con-
tain a racial classification,328 the debates surrounding these
measures are inextricably tied to racial issues and deserving of the
same caution those issues engender in legislation with racial classifi-
cations.  The supposition that because a statute does not contain a
classification it is non-discriminatory and undeserving of height-
ened scrutiny is formalistic because it removes benefits permissibly
grams, with no past discrimination, and with educational diversity, might undertake to
subordinate equality and remedial concerns to anti-classification concerns.  That situa-
tion is outside the scope of consideration here, but much of the analysis is still applica-
ble to such a circumstance, even if it is presently unlikely that it could occur.
327. Before the law could be scrutinized, the plaintiff would have to overcome the
threshold issues of standing and immunity.  To establish standing, a plaintiff must show
a “concrete and particularized” injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  Second, is a “causal
connection between injury and [defendant’s] conduct[.]” Id. (citations omitted).
Third, the court must be able to redress the injury by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-61.
Similar to challengers to affirmative action programs, challengers to repeals would have
standing.  The injury alleged would be the loss of the benefit from affirmative action,
the loss of which is caused by the state’s action, and the injury would be redressed by a
favorable court decision overturning the repeal.
As to immunity, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and subsequent cases, a
state official (and thereby the state) can be sued for prospective relief from constitu-
tional violations. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE
CONSTITUTION 11-12 (Foundation Press 2000).
328. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1997).
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assigned by classifications and only affects those classes benefiting
from the law.  This reasoning suffers from an ignorance, perhaps
willful, of the manner in which race can permeate a debate over
passage of the law,329 and likely, decisions.330
Finally, under the logic of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropol-
itan Housing Development Corp.,331 most debates surrounding mea-
sures to end affirmative action will evince a discriminatory purpose
as a motivating factor.  It is not necessary for animus or stereotype
to be the primary factor, so long as it is a “motivating” factor.332  It
is arguable that any evidence of impermissible purpose should trig-
ger greater scrutiny because it may indicate a wider problem of in-
vidious purpose or use of stereotype that can only be guarded
against by judicial inquiry.  For example, Arlington Heights lists the
historical background of the decision to take an action as well as
the specific sequence of events leading to the challenged action as
areas for inquiry.333  In California’s efforts to end affirmative action,
the historical background of the decision and sequence of events
unarguably indicate purposes and debates mired in racial
politics.334
This is particularly important where such measures are passed
by voter referendum.  Voter initiatives, although popular and con-
sistent with democratic values, can undercut important republican
safeguards.335  Legislatures are better equipped than the general
329. See, e.g., LYDIA CHA´VEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA’S BATTLE TO END AFFIRM-
ATIVE ACTION (Univ. of Cal. Press 1998); Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-Coding”
Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611
(2000); Adam Clymer, Divisive Words: New Analysis: G.O.P.’s 40 Years of Juggling on Race,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A1.
330. PAUL M SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 101-04 (Belknap
1993).  In a series of questions, where whites were questioned in varying orders about
affirmative action and characteristics of blacks, when characterizations of blacks were
discussed first, 26% of whites would characterize blacks as “irresponsible.” Id.  When
affirmative action was discussed first, however, the negative characterization leapt to
46%. Id.  The authors contend that this is a reflection of the divisiveness of affirmative
action. Id.
331. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
332. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
333. Id. at 267.
334. See supra discussion Part II-B-ii.
335. Jodi Miller, Affirmative Action: “Democracy in Free Fall”: The Use of Ballot Initiatives
to Dismantle State-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 9
(1999).
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public to evaluate and formulate legislation due to their expertise
and resources.336  Also, legislative debate allows for compromise,
whereas voter referenda do not.337  Indeed, the machinery of refer-
enda is political persuasion, which limits voter education,338 partic-
ularly in a topic as complicated as affirmative action.339  Most
importantly, a voter initiative allows a majority to dominate minor-
ity interests with little of the safeguards that a representative gov-
ernment ensures.340  Although legislative purpose may be difficult
to ascertain in referenda because of the scale of the debate, the
misunderstanding among voters, and the size of the electorate, this
should not dissuade judicial scrutiny.  In some ways, it may make
judicial scrutiny of referenda easier.341  Because the concerns un-
derlying strict scrutiny of laws implementing affirmative action are
present when ending affirmative action, when a state chooses to
end affirmative action, it should be automatically subject to strict
scrutiny.
B. A New Test to Detect Impermissible Purpose
Even if a court chooses to apply strict scrutiny, it is unclear
what the current tests for impermissible purpose would be in such a
case.  Whereas courts have been extremely diligent in examining
the implementation of affirmative action programs,342 they have
been less exhaustive in their examination of state actions to end
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.  Although information is available for the motivated voter, the motivation
and education level of any single voter with respect to issues at stake in referenda is
questionable, particularly when considering an issue with the complexity of an affirma-
tive action program.
339. See CHA´VEZ, supra note 329, at 207.
340. Miller, supra note 335, at 8.  An example of this is California’s passage of Pro-
position 209.  There whites comprising 74% of the electorate ended affirmative action
although minorities voted overwhelmingly to retain it. See text supra note 147.
341. For example, polling data may be indicative of the various reasons a voter or
block of voters acted.  Secondly, it may make the racial nature of an issue apparent.  In
California’s vote on Proposition 209, whites overwhelmingly voted to end affirmative
action while minorities voted against the measure.  Although “facially neutral,” the vast
majority of the electorate apparently did not see it as such.
342. See Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910
(9th Cir. 1991) (O’Scannlain, J.) (striking down affirmative action law after applying
strict scrutiny).
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affirmative action.343  While Arlington Heights gives a non-exhaustive
list of subjects for inquiry,344 the factors in Arlington Heights may be
ineffective at detecting a racist motivation in actions to end affirma-
tive action. Arlington Heights considers the historical background of
the decision, the specific sequence of events leading to a decision,
whether there has been a procedural or substantive departure from
prior decisions, and the legislative history.345  With the coding of
racist language, it is easy for a court using the Arlington Heights fac-
tors to miss or ignore the evidence of impermissible purpose.346  Al-
ternatively, a court may not use the Arlington Heights factors at all,
especially if the issue of impermissible intent is not raised.347
Despite this, some of the factors considered in cases like Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke348 and City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.349 are useful because they are more relevant to con-
siderations of measures ending affirmative action programs than to
examinations of laws implementing them.  While Bakke’s and
Croson’s considerations of “innocent white victims” are barely justifi-
able in the context of implementing affirmative action,350 in the
343. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997)
(O’Scannlain, J.) (the deficiencies of O’Scannlain’s examination of the issues are ad-
dressed supra Part III-B).  If one compares Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion in Economic
Equity and Coral Construction, 941 F.2d 910, with Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791 (9th
Cir. 2004) (upholding segregation of prisoners by race in California prisons) in light of
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252, a court could infer that his substantive inconsistency
may trigger closer scrutiny of his decisions. See id. at 267; see also discussion of Spann,
supra note 186.  It is unclear what form this review would take.
344. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68.
345. Id. at 266-68.
346. Although a good starting point, the Arlington Heights factors do not work well
enough to uncover hidden racism.  Despite Justice Powell’s discussion of the complex
factors involved in decisionmaking, id. at 265 (“Rarely can it be said that a legislature
. . . made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular
purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.”), the stark impact cases he gave, id. at
266, or the cases he used to illustrate the factors for examination, id. at 267-68, do not
reflect the complexity of motivation he acknowledged.
347. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
348. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
349. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
350. David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judi-
cial Conservatism or Conservative Justices, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 803-09 (1991). See also
Seth D. Harris, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 577 (2005) (comparing the “innocence” of whites
who benefit from discrimination with family members of fictional mobster Tony So-
prano, who benefit from his criminal activities).
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context of ending affirmative action, those considerations point to
the conclusion that the “innocent white” majority is acting with ra-
cial animus or stereotype.  For example, the Supreme Court’s con-
cern that affirmative action may promote racism among frustrated
whites351 adds to the appearance of racist purpose in ending affirm-
ative action.  Following the Court’s logic, with affirmative action
programs having been in place since the Johnson administration, it
is highly likely that affirmative action programs have already fo-
mented racism or stereotypes which would affect the purposes and
motivations of people considering any measure to end such pro-
grams.352  This was born out by the motivations of the originators of
the Proposition 209 campaign in California, where Thomas E.
Wood began the drive to pass Proposition 209 because he perceived
that opportunities were being taken from him by minorities.353
There is also a correlation between the reasons for requiring
that a legislature make contemporaneous findings of fact and state
a permissible purpose when implementing affirmative action pro-
grams,354 and requiring the same when the state acts to end affirm-
ative action.  In both cases, this requirement is probative of whether
the state acted on an impermissible stereotype.  For example, if a
state enacted an affirmative action program to redress past discrimi-
nation and made the proper findings of fact outlining the present
effects of discrimination, in order to end that program, the state
should need to show that the program has achieved the desired
results and is no longer necessary, or has failed and must be dis-
Indeed, there is even a similarity between Powell’s language in his consideration of
innocent third parties and Southern Senators’ defense of segregation. Compare Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (“[T]here is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons
in respondent’s position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their mak-
ing.”), with 100 CONG. REC. 7252 (1954) (Senator Eastland, discussing Brown, said, “Will
not the commingling of the races in public schools have a detrimental effect upon
white children?”).
351. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (1980); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
352. This probability is supported by studies. See PAUL M SNIDERMAN & THOMAS
PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 101-04 (Belknap 1993).
353. LYDIA CHA´VEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA’S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE AC-
TION 2-17 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1998).  Wood teamed with Glynn Custred to start the
voter initiative to end affirmative action.  It is questionable where Wood’s perception
crossed into unfounded stereotypes.
354. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-09.  The permissible purposes for an affirmative action
program are redressing past discrimination or educational diversity. Id.
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carded or modified.  This will help rebut a presumption that the
state acted on an unfounded racial stereotype that such programs
are no longer necessary or do not work.355
This would also help rebut any indication that the repeal of an
affirmative action program was rooted in racial animus.  If the state
made a finding in implementing an affirmative action program that
past state discrimination led to the current inequitable distribution
of opportunity, and ending an affirmative action program would
reintroduce that distribution, the state could be viewed as pur-
posely resurrecting the past discriminatory distribution of re-
sources.  This is different from the basis of disproportionate impact
claims, such as in Washington v. Davis.356  In implementing an af-
firmative action program, the state made a policy decision from
which ending the program would be a substantive departure trig-
gering greater scrutiny under Arlington Heights.357  In the dispropor-
tionate impact cases, there was no prior state policy from which to
depart.358
Because of these considerations, when a state acts to end an
affirmative action program, a court should apply strict scrutiny and
require the state to rebut a presumption that it acted with an imper-
missible purpose by making contemporaneous findings of fact of
the fulfillment or failure of the original objectives of the affirmative
action program.  The court should also be extremely sensitive to
the presence of racial politics and “coded” rhetoric in the state’s
debates when examining purposes.  Where these politics and rheto-
ric appear, a court should be extremely wary, even if a contempora-
neous finding was made, because the finding may have been
skewed in light of political pressures or unreasonable in light of the
actual facts.  Therefore, the fact finding should be reasonable in
light of the existing social tensions.  To perform these inquiries ade-
355. CHA´VEZ, supra note 353, at 215-22 (discussing advertising campaigns that ques-
tioned necessity or effectiveness of affirmative action programs without findings of
fact).  Governor Wilson also ignored the complications of statistics and studies, focusing
on the racial politics when ending affirmative action at the University of California. Id.
at 61-63.
356. 426 U.S. 229.
357. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
358. See id.; Davis, 426 U.S. 229.  In Davis, the test was already skewed towards
whites, and in Arlington Heights, the zoning statute pre-existed the plans for the develop-
ment.  In neither case, there was no departure from a prior policy.
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quately, courts will have to be much more sensitive to the realities
of race in United States than they have been and aggressively pur-
sue any hint of impermissible purposes.
C. The New Test Applied
If this test had been adopted and applied to the facts in Coali-
tion for Economic Equity v. Wilson,359 the results of that case would
have been much different.  The parties and the courts in the litiga-
tion surrounding Proposition 209 ignored an anti-racism Equal Pro-
tection argument, focusing exclusively on the political structure
arguments.360  Under the new test, strict scrutiny would automati-
cally apply, particularly because the issue was decided by voter refer-
endum.361  The state would then have to prove contemporaneous
findings of fact that the original purposes for enacting affirmative
action programs had been fulfilled, and that racial politics or coded
rhetoric did not influence the fact finding.  Contrary to the Ninth
Circuit’s assertion that “we must have more than a vague inkling of
what the law actually does” to decide whether the law is in conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment,362 once standing is found,363 the
alleged impermissible purpose is enough to place the law in viola-
tion of the Constitution.364
In enacting Proposition 209, California did not make any legis-
lative findings of fact because the measure was passed by voter initi-
ative.  The text on the ballot did not include any findings of fact.365
The ballot pamphlets had no findings with respect to the need for
359. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
360. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d 692; Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp.
1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996).  Note that the parties and courts forgot that the purpose for the
political structure doctrine is to protect against impermissible purposes. See Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1969).
361. See discussion supra Part IV-A.
362. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 700.
363. See discussion, supra note 327.
364. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977) (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).  Indeed, impact alone is nearly irrelevant,
unless stark, id., or impacting whites. See David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative
Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 790, 803-09 (1991).
365. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 696.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 55 29-APR-05 9:37
2005] JUDICIAL BIAS IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 1227
affirmative action.366  Moreover, the scope of the ban on affirmative
action was statewide and applied to programs at all levels of state
and local government, which supports the inference that no ade-
quate fact finding was made.  The legislative findings on the success
or failure of affirmative action required to show that a state acted
without an unsupported stereotype would have likely been quite
lengthy and detailed, particularly in a state the size of California.
There is little likelihood that of 4,736,180 Californian residents vot-
ing to enact Proposition 209, a decisive percentage did so without
acting on some stereotype or animosity.367
Similarly, the manner in which the arguments were framed in
the debate should trigger greater judicial scrutiny.  From the adver-
tising campaigns,368 to the political decisions,369 to the ballot pam-
phlet,370 the entirety of the Proposition 209 debate was inextricably
mired in racial politics and coded rhetoric.  This infection of the
debate would have required California to show that the racist polit-
ics and rhetoric did not affect the fact finding (if it had been made)
and decision, which in a referendum like California’s would be im-
possible.  One benefit of a stringent standard would be to force the
complicated debates surrounding affirmative action programs into
the legislature, which is at least theoretically more capable of a rea-
soned and nuanced consideration of the issues involved.  Because
California could not have met either of its burdens under the test
in its enactment of Proposition 209,371 the Proposition should have
been struck down under the Equal Protection Clause.
366. Id. at 696-97 (“And two wrongs don’t make a right!  Today, students are being
rejected . . . because of their RACE.  Job applicants are turned away because [of] their
RACE[.]”).  Instead of fact finding, the ballot pamphlet took the stereotypical concepts
of affirmative action programs and used the stereotypes to incite the “victims” of affirm-
ative action programs along racial lines.
367. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE (Belknap 1993).
See also TOMA´S ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE
SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (Univ. of Cal. Press 1994).
368. LYDIA CHA´VEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA’S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE AC-
TION 216-17, 227-33 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1998).
369. Id. at 66-67.
370. Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 696-97.
371. This includes the application of Proposition 209 banning future programs.
The issue of whether the state action is a repeal of existing programs or a prospective
ban on future programs is only relevant to standing. See discussion supra notes 326-27.
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Another example of how the new test could be applied is a
hypothetical action by a state university to end a minority scholar-
ship program.372  Rutgers University, a state university in New
Jersey, awards the James Dickson Carr Scholarship to an outstand-
ing, underrepresented minority student.373  Suppose that this schol-
arship was implemented to allow an underrepresented minority,
who displayed great academic promise, but who lacked sufficient
funds to afford school, to attend Rutgers.  Imagine Rutgers made
the initial determination for the permissible purpose of promoting
educational diversity.  Now envision a poor white student who is ad-
mitted to Rutgers, but can only afford to attend by taking out stu-
dent loans.  Once at Rutgers, this white student writes the Board of
Governors of the university374 seeking an end to “unjust discrimina-
tion on the basis of race.”  This student copies a candidate for gov-
ernor, who hoping to follow Pete Wilson’s success in California,
makes the minority scholarship a campaign issue.
The incumbent governor, worried about how the media is por-
traying the controversy, orders the Board of Governors to examine
Rutgers’ policy on minority scholarships.  The Board of Governors
acts and finds that ten percent of minority students receive scholar-
ships based in part on race, and that the loss of those scholarships
would jeopardize an unknown percentage of these students’ ability
to attend Rutgers.  The Board also finds that although educational
diversity is an important goal, they are going to discontinue the mi-
nority scholarships because they are “unfair to white students.”  A
372. This is based on a scenario from Stuart Silverstein, Pepperdine Defends Its Minor-
ity Scholarships, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at B1 (discussing challenges to race-based
scholarships and scholars programs), as well as Gov. Pete Wilson’s efforts to end affirm-
ative action at the University of California.
373. A list of scholarships available at http://studentaid.rutgers.edu/catalog/un-
dergradadmissions.asp reads:
James Dickson Carr Scholarship. Awarded to outstanding minority students
selected on the basis of academic promise, as demonstrated in high school
work and SAT or ACT scores, and on the basis of participation in extracur-
ricular activities in school and community.
This scholarship is administered directly by Rutgers University’s Office of Admissions.
Special thanks to Ben from the Rutgers’ admissions office who helped with that infor-
mation, but did not give his last name.
374. Rutgers is governed by the Board of Governors, who are comprised of eleven
voting members, six appointed by the governor of New Jersey, and five appointed by an
advisory Board of Trustees. Governing Boards of the University, available at http://ruweb.
rutgers.edu/governance/.
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minority student, facing the loss of his scholarship, files suit in fed-
eral court.375
Under the new test, the state action to end affirmative action
would be automatically subject to strict scrutiny.  The state would
have to prove by a reasonable finding that the goals of the original
affirmative action program had been fulfilled or the program had
been unsuccessful, and that racial politics and rhetoric did not in-
fluence the decision.  In the hypothetical, it is unlikely, but possi-
ble, for the state to meet its burden.376
The question of whether the affirmative action program had
fulfilled its goal would depend on the evidence relied on at the
implementation of the program and the evidence used to support
its repeal.  For example, if minority enrollment had increased to a
percentage that reflected educational diversity, then the goals of
the program may have been achieved.  Nevertheless, the finding
that upon ending the program minority enrollment would fall
would be a countervailing consideration in evaluating the reasona-
bleness of the decision.  Furthermore, the normative proposition
being the same — that educational diversity is a goal — there is a
substantial departure from pursuing that goal with an affirmative
action program to pursuing the goal without a program.377  This
substantial departure may indicate a purpose rooted in racism or
stereotype.  Therefore, depending on the strength of the statistics,
it is unlikely that a state could meet its burden, especially if the
debate has been affected by any racial politics.
In the hypothetical, it is unclear the extent to which racial
politics would have played a roll in ending the minority scholarship
program.  The governor ordering a review, itself, probably would
not be enough.  If the gubernatorial campaign featured affirmative
action as an area of wide contention and debate, however, and the
governor pressured the Board,378 that would be enough to trigger a
375. The student would have standing, much like the plaintiffs in Economic Equity,
946 F. Supp at 1491-92, because he could allege the loss of the benefit, caused by the
enforcement of the repeal, which can be redressed by the court. See also discussion,
supra note 327.
376. Much of the probability of success for the state in defending its action may
depend on more particularized facts than are able to be included here.
377. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
378. Similar to the ending of affirmative action at the University of California. See
CHA´VEZ, supra note 368, at 56-67.
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court’s much closer scrutiny of the basis of the findings of fact.
This would also be true if there was campus unrest as various stu-
dent groups lobbied the Board using racial politics, or if the Board
members showed racial coding or racial politics in their debates on
the program.379
As these examples show, a reconsideration of how racism is dis-
played and acted upon in measures ending affirmative action pro-
grams will enable courts to stop this new hidden racism and allow
governments to end affirmative action at appropriate times and for
permissible reasons.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no more important application of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause than its protection against invidious purposes.  If courts
cannot adequately examine the purposes behind nominally neutral
legislation targeted at minority interests, then racism will continue
to limit the opportunities of traditionally oppressed people.  Per-
missible affirmative action programs are implemented after rigor-
ous inquiry; ending them should require the same meticulous
examination.  Only by acknowledging the similarity of the princi-
ples involved and the manner in which racism manifests itself in the
world today can the opportunities of all be protected by principled
courts enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.
379. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
